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1 
The Forgotten Stewards of Higher 
Education Quality 
Matthew Adam Bruckner* 
A “triad” of regulators is supposed to ensure that student loan borrowers are not harmed 
by low-value institutions of higher education, including exploitative profiteers operating  
fly-by-night or predatory institutions of higher education. The triad has failed. Millions of 
students have borrowed billions of federal student loan dollars that they won’t ever repay, 
causing borrowers to suffer needless economic harm and psychological anguish. But these harms 
were, are, and remain mostly preventable. This Article appears to be the first law review 
article to consider the states’ role in policing institutional quality and ensuring that student 
borrowers are not preyed upon by low-value institutions of higher education. It suggests concrete 
steps states could take, such as adopting a state version of financial responsibility scores, the 
gainful employment rule, or a cohort default rate metric, to avoid being characterized as the 
forgotten stewards of higher education quality.  
  
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. This Article was inspired by Tariq 
Habash of the Student Borrower Protection Center. It benefitted from the comments received in 
connection with presentations at the “Consumer Protection in the Age of the Student Debt Crisis” 
symposium at UC Irvine School of Law and to the 2020 AALS Annual Meeting’s student loan 
discussion group. I would like to thank Christopher Bradley, Yan Cao, Seth Frotman, Tariq Habash, 
Michael Itzkowitz, Angela Perry, Carla Reyes, Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, and Ramsi Woodcock for their 
comments, ideas, and suggestions. Research assistance was provided by Eri Aguilar, Victoria Capatosto, 
Elizabeth Gabaud, Paul Lisbon, and Zoe Nwabunka. As always, this Article would not have been 
possible without my wife’s support. (Thanks Morgan!) Research support was provided by Howard 
University School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 18, 2019, a receiver was appointed to oversee the colleges operated 
by Dream Center Education Holdings (Dream Center), including various colleges 
run under the Art Institute, Argosy, and South University brands.1 Dream Center’s 
receivership followed the mysterious disappearance of millions of dollars earmarked 
for student borrowers.2 By mid-March, most Dream Center institutions had closed, 
compelling students to transfer to other institutions to complete their degree or to 
drop out entirely.3  
Obviously, Dream Center’s closure took a substantial toll on its students.4 For 
students who intended to continue their studies, they were forced to find another 
 
1. Ashley A. Smith, Nonprofit Dream Center Institutions Placed in Receivership, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/21/nonprofit-dream-center-
institutions-placed-receivership [https://perma.cc/Y255-WYA8].  
2. Ben Unglesbee, Judge Orders End to Dream Center’s Ill-fated Receivership, EDUC. DIVE  
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.educationdive.com/news/judge-orders-end-to-dream-centers-ill-fated-
receivership/553731/ [https://perma.cc/292L-RXHK]. 
3. See id. 
4. Chris Quintana, A College Closed, Leaving Thousands Without a Degree. How to Keep It from 
Happening to You, USA TODAY (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
education/2019/03/26/how-to-choose-a-college-argosy-university-college-closing/3211480002/ 
[https://perma.cc/2PG9-L297 ] (relating one student’s “chaotic and emotional” experience of one 
Argosy branch closing, and how the school’s closure “inflamed a chronic medical condition”); see also 
Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 264 n.261 (2018) 
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school willing to accept them and give them credit for their previous studies. But 
transferring students often lose most of their credits.5 And if an institution of higher 
education (IHE) suddenly closes, as Dream Center did, students may find it even 
more difficult to transfer.6 For example, Dream Center inadvertently destroyed 
some student records in the process of vacating the school’s previous office space.7 
In addition, such students often need to physically move to another city, potentially 
on short notice.8 On top of it all, sudden changes are often stressful for people.  
Of course, some students will be unable or unwilling to transfer to a new 
institution after their school closes.9 These students may drop out entirely.10 
Ostensibly, these students are entitled to discharge their federal student-loan debt.11 
But the U.S. Department of Education (ED or the Department) has failed to 
promptly “discharge federal student loans of eligible students impacted by [all recent 
IHE] closures.”12 This uncertainty must only compound the stress experienced by 
students at closed schools. 
 
[hereinafter Bruckner, DNRs] (“Moreover, it remains disruptive to a student’s education, even if the 
now-closed school implements a so-called ‘teach out’ plan.”). 
5. A 2017 Government Accountability Office report found that “students who transferred 
from private for-profit schools to public schools . . . lost an estimated 94 percent of their credits.”  
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-574, HIGHER EDUCATION: STUDENTS NEED MORE 
INFORMATION TO HELP REDUCE CHALLENGES IN TRANSFERRING COLLEGE CREDITS 15 (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686530.pdf [https://perma.cc/3U7Y-5A3Q]. 
6. See Rachel Leingang, Argosy University Is Withholding Financial Aid. Students Can’t Pay Their 
Bills., USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/
2019/02/08/argosy-university-financial-aid-closing-receivership-accreditation/2817950002/ [https:// 
perma.cc/T3RF-LFSF]. 
7. Statement Regarding the Destruction of Education Training Files at Argosy University, 
Atlanta Campus at 2–3, Digit. Media Sols., LLC v. S. Univ. of Ohio, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-145, 2019 WL 
1958510 (N.D. Ohio May 2, 2019) (acknowledging that “the training records for (we believe) thirty 
three clinical psychology students” were destroyed and that “likely the only way to replace this material” 
is via a “cumbersome and unpleasant” process (for the students)). 
8. See Unglesbee, supra note 2. 
9. For example, Mount Ida College students were offered automatic admission to the University 
of Massachusetts Dartmouth, but with the schools approximately seventy miles apart, transferring from 
Mount Ida to Dartmouth was too much for some students. See generally Scott Jaschik, Another Small 
College Closing: Mount Ida, After Trying for a Merger, Will Shut Down, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/09/mount-ida-after-trying-merger-will-
shut-down [https://perma.cc/2E2L-UG3E] (“On social media, many current students said they felt 
betrayed by the college’s announcement -- and that the option of enrolling at the University of 
Massachusetts at Dartmouth was not viable for them. Depending on where in the Boston area Mount 
Ida students live, the drive to Dartmouth is 70-85 miles. One student wrote on Facebook, ‘Are you 
kidding me? . . . This is absolutely ridiculous. I chose Mount Ida because it was relatively close to my 
home and near Boston. Dartmouth is two hours away and doesn’t even have my major!’”). 
10. See Unglesbee, supra note 2. 
11. See Has Your School Closed? Here’s What to Do, FED. STUDENT AID, https://
studentaid.gov/announcements-events/closed-school [https://perma.cc/YB6Z-PZU6] ( last visited 
Sept. 23, 2020). And private student loan debt does not enjoy similar treatment.  
12. Margaret Mattes, Lawsuit Calls on Department of Education to Provide Relief to Students 
Whose Schools Closed, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www. 
studentloanborrowerassistance.org/lawsuit-calls-on-department-of-education-to-provide-relief-to-
students-whose-school-closed/ [https://perma.cc/2ZYT-QTSP]. 
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Dream Center’s failure is just one of many high-profile failures that has caused 
serious harm to its student population.13 Mount Ida College, Corinthian Colleges, 
ITT Tech, DeVry, and Education Corporation of America all “collapsed,” which 
affected tens of thousands of students.14 This “wave of institutional closures” 
should force policymakers to consider how to protect students from suffering 
similar harms at the hands of other institutions.15 Moreover, students may be 
harmed in many other ways by IHEs.16 Although state governments are only one 
leg of the regulatory triad intended to ensure that IHEs provide a high-quality 
education to (and a good value for) students, they are currently best positioned to 
take action to protect students.17 Neither ED nor accrediting agencies seem to be 
up to the task or willing to perform their obligations. As such, this Article considers 
what states can do on their own. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I expands upon this introduction by 
explaining the harms wrought on students by our student loan system and low-value 
IHEs. It argues that, under our current higher education funding regime, students 
 
13. Even students who attended a Dream Center institution that didn’t close, such as students 
at the Western State College of Law at Argosy University, suffered from the collapse of the wider 
Dream Center enterprise. For example, these students never received their financial aid for the spring 
2019 semester. Leingang, supra note 6 (explaining that as a result, “[s]tudents from campuses across the 
country described missing rent payments, not being able to afford gas and food, not being able to afford 
daycare for their children”). 
14. “In 2014, Corinthian Colleges collapsed despite being in good standing with the Accrediting 
Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS). A few years after that, ITT Tech followed suit, 
and then Education Corporation of America and its 70 campuses.” CLARE MCCANN & AMY 
LAITINEN, THE BERMUDA TRIAD: WHERE ACCOUNTABILITY GOES TO DIE 13 (2019) (citing Andrew 




see also Yan Cao, How Betsy DeVos Got Schooled by the Education Corporation of America, CENTURY 
FOUND. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/betsy-devos-got-schooled-education-
corporation-america/ [https://perma.cc/Q5VZ-27TR] (“Last week, Education Corporation of 
America (ECA), a for-profit college conglomerate that has operated chains like Virginia College, 
Brightwood, and Golf Academy, hastily announced the sudden closure of campuses nationwide. 
Estimates suggest that nearly 20,000 students across the United States will be impacted.”); Matthew 
Bruckner, Enron & ITT Tech, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2016/09/enron-itt-tech.html [https://perma.cc/H8Q3-LXPP]; Matthew Bruckner, 
Who’s Looking Out for the Students?, CREDIT SLIPS ( Jan. 20, 2015, 8:49 PM), https://
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/01/whos-looking-out-for-the-students.html [https:// 
perma.cc/2UY6-ZMRP]. 
15. DAVID A. TANDBERG, ELLIE M. BRUECKER & DUSTIN D. WEEDEN, STATE HIGHER 
EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS ASS’N, IMPROVING STATE AUTHORIZATION: THE STATE ROLE IN 
ENSURING QUALITY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (2019), https://
sheeo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/SHEEO_StateAuth.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP88-CLCM] 
(“A renewed level of interest in and scrutiny of public accountability of higher education has recently 
been fueled by a wave of institutional closures . . . .”). 
16. See infra Part I. 
17. “While much of the attention has focused on the role of accreditors and the federal 
government, the central actors in the higher education public accountability space are the states.” 
TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. 
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are harmed when they pay for an education that does not increase their earning 
power sufficiently to pay off their student loan debt. Part II discusses the existing 
regulatory framework, including why neither ED nor accreditors seem capable of 
ensuring that students receive an economic return on their higher education 
expenditures,18 or even simply protecting all students from exploitation. 
Finally, Part III looks at a range of options that interested states could adopt 
to prevent IHEs from exploiting state residents. These options are based on 
programs that ED has previously used and include the gainful employment rule and 
a cohort default rate metric to ensure that students get a financial19 return on their 
higher education expenditures. And it also includes better information gathering 
tools to create financial responsibility scores for colleges to better anticipate (and 
hopefully prevent) college collapses and the concomitant student harm. This part 
also considers how states could encourage IHEs to report data and comply with 
state regulation, including limiting state authorization or accessing additional 
funding. A conclusion follows.  
I. STUDENT HARM 
“[A]s more students have had to borrow, and borrow more, to even attempt a degree or 
credential program, some are ending up even worse off than before they started, with thousands 
of dollars of debt and little or no increased earnings power to pay it off.”20 
 
Whether or not a student attends an IHE that closes precipitously, students 
are hurt when they borrow heavily to attend an institution that does not sufficiently  
boost their earning power to repay their educational debt.21 And alumni of hundreds 
 
18. The author believes that higher education is a quasi-public good justifying larger public 
investment and is not simply a private good. Increasingly, however, elected officials appear to disagree, 
and individuals have been asked to shoulder a larger portion of the cost of higher education. It is within 
this latter paradigm that this Article was written. 
19. While there are surely other important returns to students (and society) from investments 
in higher education, there must also be some point at which we, collectively, are willing to describe an 
IHE as acting in its own best interests instead of the best interests of its students. In my opinion, such 
schools should not be permitted to operate. At a minimum, such schools should not be supported with 
taxpayer funds.  
20. NEHA DALAL, BETH STEIN & JESSICA THOMPSON, THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS  
& SUCCESS, OF METRICS AND MARKETS: MEASURING POST-COLLEGE EMPLOYMENT SUCCESS 4 
(2018), https://ticas.org/files/pub_files/of_metrics_markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX9Z-SU5C]. 
21. See Patrick F. Linehan, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools’ 
Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 754 (2001) (describing the plight of several students defrauded by 
predatory colleges that offered no-value “educations” and claiming that these stories are “typical of 
many individuals, often of low socioeconomic and educational status, who attempt to improve their 
labor skills by enrolling in vocational training schools”); see also Michael Itzkowitz, Price-to-Earnings 
Premium: A New Way of Measuring Return on Investment in Higher Ed, THIRD WAY (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.thirdway.org/report/price-to-earnings-premium-a-new-way-of-measuring-return-on-
investment-in-higher-ed [https://perma.cc/9R2X-2HZL] (discussing interest from some 
Congresspersons in developing “policies that would protect students from poor-performing colleges 
and programs”); TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT 
COLLEGES IN THE NEW ECONOMY 67 (THE NEW PRESS 2017) (“As it turns out, there is such a thing 
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of colleges leave school making “well below the average earnings of a worker with 
only a high school diploma.”22 In some cases, alumni fare poorly because the 
schools are outright frauds.23 Among others, ITT Tech and its executives were 
credibly accused of fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) at the time it closed in 2016.24 
Even when a school is not defrauding students outright, students may attend 
well-meaning but low-value institutions that fail to adequately prepare students for 
the job market.25 At these IHEs, students may not learn important skills. For 
example, many students show no “significant improvement in critical thinking, 
complex reasoning, and written communication skills after four years of college 
coursework.”26 Several commentators have suggested that “[a] significant chunk of 
our higher-education system, perhaps as much as thirty or forty percent, does not 
graduate students into jobs with high enough salaries to justify the cost of providing 
the education.”27 And some schools may simply lack the resources, ability, or 
interest to adequate support all of their students.28 
 
as ‘bad’ education. It is an educational option that, by design, cannot increase students’ odds of beating 
the circumstances of their birth.”). 
22. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 5; see also Michael Itzkowitz, Higher Ed’s Broken 
Bridge to the Middle Class, THIRD WAY (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.thirdway.org/report/higher-eds-
broken-bridge-to-the-middle-class [https://perma.cc/XEL2-LDB3] (“When measuring  
post-enrollment earnings six years after enrollment, there are 257—or 6.5% of all institutions with 
earnings data available—where over four-fifths of the student body fails to earn as much as the average 
high school graduate. And there are a whopping 2,075 institutions (52% of all institutions) where over 
half of students who enroll are earning less than a high school graduate six years later.”). 
23. See Linehan, supra note 21, at 759 (discussing various misrepresentations that proprietary 
schools may make to students, including “students’ prospects for employment upon graduation,” and 
the reasons why those schools make such misrepresentations). 
24. See Yan Cao & Tariq Habash, College Complaints Unmasked, CENTURY FOUND. (Nov. 8, 
2017), https://tcf.org/content/report/college-complaints-unmasked/ [https://perma.cc/VRW5-
QT4W] (“By the time ITT closed in September 2016, it was under investigation by multiple state 
attorneys general offices; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which oversees Wall Street, had 
charged its executives with fraud; and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) had 
uncovered ‘secret shopper’ evidence showing that ITT recruiters regularly lied to potential students.”).  
25. See MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 5 (“[T]he U.S. also hosts thousands of  
poor- and under-performing colleges, where millions of students are paying—and often borrowing—a 
lot.”); see also Linehan, supra note 21, at 759; Preston Cooper, Taxpayers Fund College Degrees that Don’t 
Pay Off, FORBES ( Jan. 21, 2020, 2:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestoncooper2/2020/01/
21/taxpayers-fund-college-degrees-that-dont-pay-off/ [https://perma.cc/3JN7-MDND]. 
26. ANDREW P. KELLY & DANIEL K. LAUTZENHEISER, TAKING CHARGE: A STATE-LEVEL 
AGENDA FOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 2 (2013), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/-taking-charge_103835525600.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK3Z-G523]. 
27. Cooper, supra note 25; see MELANIE DELGADO, CHILD.’S ADVOC. INST., FAILING U 2 
(2018) (“[F]or-profit colleges of all sizes are over-promising and under-delivering when it comes to the 
quality of their academic programs and offerings, as well as the ability of their graduates to cash in on 
lucrative careers.”); DALAL ET AL., supra note 20. 
28.  See generally MCMILLAN COTTOM, supra note 21 (discussing the financialization of the  
for-profit higher education sector and suggesting that, at some IHEs, maximizing enrollment to satisfy 
shareholder demands is more important than providing “good” educations for students). 
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Students who borrow money but never graduate are particularly likely to be 
harmed by that borrowing.29 Unfortunately, these harms disproportionately befall 
minority student loan borrowers.30 Even for students who graduate, default rates 
on student loan debts are much higher for minority borrowers than for white 
borrowers.31 Twelve years after first taking out a student loan, forty-nine percent of 
Black borrowers (including twenty-three percent of bachelor’s degree attainers) 
have defaulted on their loans and thirty-six percent of Hispanic borrowers 
(including fourteen percent of bachelor’s degree attainers) have defaulted on their 
loans, whereas only twenty-one percent of white borrowers (including just six 
percent of bachelor’s degree attainers) have defaulted.32  
For some, higher education offers a pathway to the middle class.33 But 
students who attend exploitative or low-quality IHEs34 are harmed twice over. First, 
they waste their time.35 Second, they waste their money.36 And a lot of borrowed 
 
29. See Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW 
DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 85–100 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (explaining that incurring 
educational debt without earning a degree can lead to bankruptcy). See generally KELLY  
& LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 1 (“Across two and four-year institutions, just half of students 
who start a degree finish it within six years.”). 
30. See KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 1; Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a 
Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2007, 9:00 AM) 
[hereinafter Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers ], 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/
new-federal-data-show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/D4NP-
B5R6]; see also Ben Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black Borrowers, CTR. FOR  
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM) [hereinafter Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black 
Borrowers ], https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2019/12/
02/477929/continued-student-loan-crisis-black-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/FX88-5TJK]; Dalié 
Jiménez & Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt Is a Civil Rights Issue: The Case for Debt Relief and Higher 
Education Reform, 55 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 131 (2020). 
31. Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, supra 
note 30; Miller, The Continued Student Loan Crisis for Black Borrowers, supra note 30; Jiménez & Glater 
supra note 30. 
32. Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American Borrowers, supra 
note 30. 
33. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, The Investment Imperative, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2019) 
(“One major aim of higher education legislation has been to increase access to bolster individual and 
societal advancement.”); see also THEA GARON, ANDREW DUNN, KATY GOLVALA & ERIC WILSON, 
FIN. HEALTH NETWORK, U.S. FINANCIAL HEALTH PULSE: 2018 BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS 38 
(2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-2018/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
07151007/FHN-Pulse_Baseline_SurveyResults-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/53J5-CLU2] (noting the 
correlation between financial health and educational attainment). 
34. Or who attend high-quality IHEs but receive a low-value education. 
35. “Thousands of students, many of them veterans, invested substantial amounts of time and 
money into pursuing degrees they never received; many of those students were left with enormous 
amounts of student loan debt, which cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.” See DELGADO, supra note 
27, at 1. 
36. KRISTIN BLAGG & KELIA WASHINGTON, URB. INST., WHICH DOLLARS GET MEASURED? 
ASSESSING EARNINGS METRICS USING DATA FROM CONNECTICUT 1 (2020), https://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101637/which_dollars_get_measured_0_4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RM5N-HK5Q] (“Similarly, when prospective students are considering where to 
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money is being wasted.37 Federal and state governments have engaged in a  
decades-long effort to increase enrollment at IHEs by making available large sums 
of money for students to borrow.38 Student aid, in the form of state and federal 
loans and grants, and, more recently, “free college” programs in various states, costs 
the federal and state governments more than $150 billion per year.39 By many 
estimates, total student indebtedness now exceeds $1.6 trillion.40 Even more 
troubling, student indebtedness is growing fast.41 
Moreover, a generation of heavily indebted students may be a problem for 
America as a whole, not just for the indebted students. Increasingly, people have 
begun to liken the student loan crisis to the subprime mortgage crisis.42 Students 
 
invest their eligible financial aid, their own money, and their time, they are also calculating whether the 
return on their investment will be greater than the monetary and nonmonetary costs.”). 
37. Most of the money that students use to pay for their education is borrowed. See Cooper, 
supra note 25 (arguing that low-quality schools should not have access to taxpayer-supported loans and 
grants); cf. BETH AKERS, MANHATTAN INST., RISK SHARING: HOW TO HOLD COLLEGES 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE EDUCATION THEY PROVIDE 4 (2019), https://media4.manhattan-
institute.org/sites/default/files/Risk-Sharing-How-to%20Hold-Colleges-Accountable-BA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9M9E-NBT5] (“The federal government is the single largest purchaser of 
postsecondary education services in the United States.”). 
38. See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 4, at 250–51 (“Federal efforts to promote college access 
through Title IV have not been cheap. The federal government indirectly provides an enormous amount 
of money to IHEs, including more than $76 billion in 2013, representing a slight majority of all student 
aid. Federal student aid takes a variety of forms, including well-known programs such as Pell Grants, 
Perkins, Grad (PLUS), and Stafford Loans. Total student loan indebtedness now tops one trillion 
dollars, almost all of it backed by federal government guarantees.”); see also Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., 
Paying for Law School: Law Student Loan Indebtedness and Career Choices, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (“The current outstanding student loan debt is roughly $1.64 trillion dollars and continues to 
grow every year.”) (citing Chris Arnold, Student Loans a Lot like the Mortgage Debacle, Says Watchdog, 
NPR (Dec. 9, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/09/785527874/student-loans-a-lot-
like-the-subprime-mortgage-debacle-watchdog-says [https://perma.cc/JX8J-3RHY] and Anya 
Kamanetz, Democratic Presidential Contenders Propose Free College and Student Loan Forgiveness, NPR 
( June 27, 2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/736342686/democratic-presidential-
contenders-propose-free-college-and-student-loan-forgive [https://perma.cc/963F-PSWJ]); Elengold, 
supra note 33, at 4. 
39. See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 4, at 250. 
40. See Ed Flynn, Game of Loans: Is Student Debt Forgiveness Coming?, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 
(2019) (noting that “[t]he St. Louis Federal Reserve, which gets information from lenders, reports that 
total student loan debt was $1.61 trillion as of June 30, 2019”). 
41. Abigail Hess, Here’s How Much the Average Student Loan Borrower Owes when They Graduate, 
CNBC MAKE IT (Feb. 15, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/heres-how-much-
the-average-student-loan-borrower-owes-when-they-graduate.html [https://perma.cc/4TCJ-RVXC] 
(“When they graduate, the average student loan borrower has $37,172 in student loans, a $20,000 
increase from 13 years ago.”); see also Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9 (quoting Matthew P. Diehr, The 
Looming Threat Posed to Student Loan Lenders and Servicers by State-Level Actors in an Era of Federal 
Regulatory Remission, 65 FED. LAW. 43, 43 (2018)). 
42. Amir Shachmurove, David M. Gettings, Stephen C. Piepgrass, Timothy St. George & Alan 
Wingfield, Federal Inaction and State Activity: Student Loan Edition, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2018, 1:12 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1066268/federal-inaction-and-state-activity-student-loan-edition 
[https://perma.cc/CJ97-N8RK] (“By 2017, student loan data shows patterns that are similar to what 
occurred prior to the subprime mortgage crisis.”); Prentiss Cox, Judith L. Fox & Stacey Tutt, Forgotten 
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are borrowing heavily and struggling to repay their debt. Many cannot. These 
students either end up in default or in some sort of loan forgiveness program.43 
“More than one million students default on almost $20 billion worth of federal 
student loans each year.”44 Many more are substantially past due on their 
payments.45 “As of August 2018, 11 million of the roughly 44.2 million borrowers 
are in a state of default or delinquency.”46 “When discussing student loan debt, it is 
easy to fixate on the aggregate impact of the burdens this debt places on tax payers, 
the economy, and borrowers alike, such as the depressive effects that [student] loan 
debt has on marriage, homeownership, and entrepreneurship.”47 
While return on investment and student indebtedness are not the only 
measures of whether an IHE is a low-value or low-quality institution (let alone 
exploitative), these issues are hard to ignore because of our extant higher education 
financing system.48 For so long as most students are effectively required to  
debt-fund their educations,49 students’ return on investment will remain an 
important criteria on which to judge whether IHEs are providing a service on which 
the federal and state governments should offer their imprimatur.50 Focusing on 
 
Borrowers: Protecting Private Student Loan Borrowers Through State Law, 11 U.C. IRVINE  
L. REV. 43 (2020) (comparing the student loan crisis to the mortgage foreclosure crisis).  
43. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9; Joy Wiltermuth, A Record One-Quarter of $450 Billion of 
Student Loans Are Being Repaid on Income-Based Repayment Plans, DBRS, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24, 
2020, 11:08 AM), https://marketwatch.com/story/a-record-one-quarter-of-450-billion-of-student-
loans-are-being-repaid-on-income-based-repayment-plans-dbrs-2020-02-22 [https://perma.cc/ 
6GMH-VWRN] (“Income-based repayment plans were being used on 24.7% of $452 billion worth of 
student loans with U.S. government backing during the fourth-quarter of 2019, up from 21.8% a year 
earlier . . . .”). 
44. Matthew Bruckner, Brook Gotberg, Dalié Jiménez & Chrystin Ondersma, A No-Contest 
Discharge for Uncollectible Student Loans, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 183, 189 (2020) [hereinafter Bruckner et 
al., No-Contest]. 
45. Shachmurove et al., supra note 42 (“In fact, per one of the most exhaustive recent studies, 
almost 40 percent of student loan borrowers are either in default or more than 90 days past due on 
their payments as of October 2017. The DOE, for its part, has reported that more than 8 million federal 
student loan borrowers are in default and have not made a payment in at least a year and another three 
million direct loan borrowers—those with debt from the largest federal student loan program—are 
delinquent on their loans and have not made a payment in more than 30 days in 2017.”). 
46. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4 n.9; Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2018: A 
$1.5 Trillion Crisis, FORBES ( June 13, 2018, 8:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/
2018/06/13/student-loan-debt-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/4ULR-LB7D]. 
47. Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 2 (discussing law school-related student loan debt). 
48. See Itzkowitz, supra note 22 (noting that students cannot easily comparison shop for high 
“value” IHEs and discussing students’ need “to easily assess how long it will take to recoup their 
educational investment—or to compare those timelines across schools or programs”). 
49. See Hess, supra note 41; Elengold, supra note 33, at 47–48 (discussing how the “investment 
imperative risks overpromising students certain financial outcomes from seeking a college certification 
or degree, encouraging overconfidence in the ability to repay education debt” and causing a “student 
debt cascade”); Ryan, Jr., supra note 38, at 4. 
50. Alternative methods of financing higher education and arguments that higher education is 
a public good are outside the scope of this Article. For more about whether we should conceive of 
higher education as a public good, see Gareth Williams, Higher Education: Public Good or Private 
Commodity?, 14 LONDON REV. EDUC. 131 (2016). 
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student outcomes can also allow state higher education regulators to become more 
actively involved with troubled institutions sooner. Too often, state attorneys 
general are the ones who first step in but only after there has already “been 
substantial harm to students and to taxpayers.”51 
The next part explores the existing regulatory framework, including a succinct 
explanation of the role of each regulator. It also explains why the existing regulatory 
framework does not provide adequate oversight of IHEs.  
II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS INADEQUATE  
“[F]ar too many schools maintain their institutional accreditation even while defrauding 
and misleading students, providing poor quality education, or closing without recourse  
for students.”52 
 
The question that motivates this Article is as follows: How can we create the 
necessary “accountability . . . to ensure students are not left to bear unaffordable 
debt,” particularly student loan debt incurred while attending low-value or 
exploitative IHEs?53 One place to begin our inquiry is with the entities responsible 
for ensuring IHEs provide affordable high-quality educations rather than prey on 
vulnerable students. These entities are known as the “program integrity triad.”54 The  
triad—our existing higher education regulatory apparatus—is composed of ED, 
accrediting agencies, and states.55 Figure 1 highlights the interplay between members 
of the triad.56 
Figure 1: Program Integrity Triad 
 
51. DELGADO, supra note 27, at 2. 
52. Ted Mitchell, Strengthening Accreditation to Protect Students, U.S. DEP’T  
EDUC.: HOMEROOM (Mar. 29, 2016), https://blog.ed.gov/2016/03/strengthening-accreditation-to-
protect-students/ [https://perma.cc/L4JR-LN25]. 
53. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 35; cf. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. 
54. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8. This Article is not going to address ex post 
enforcement through litigation, including tort, contract, or consumer law theories of recovery. 
55. Id. at 5–6. 
56. Figure 1 copied from MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 6. 
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“This distributed approach to higher education accountability is designed to keep 
governmental intrusion in higher education to a minimum and maintain a proper 
division of powers between the states, the institutions and the  
federal government.”57  
The triad needs to be reinvigorated. This regulatory framework predates the 
introduction and growth of federal aid programs, which have changed institutional 
behavior as entities chase this massive infusion of federal money.58 And it “provides 
little or no assurance that schools are educating students efficiently and 
effectively.”59 Perhaps as a result, McCann & Laitinen describe our current 
framework as the “‘Bermuda triad,’ with the mysterious disappearance of rigorous 
oversight of colleges that are known by all actors to be problems.”60 In some ways, 
the triad appears to have parallels to bank regulation prior to the 2008 financial 
crisis. Both regulatory schemes attempted to create a collaborative state-federal 
partnership, and both resulted in a regulatory lacuna, with no single entity having 
the authority and interest in adequately overseeing its charges. 
The roles of each member of the triad are discussed in the three sections that 
follow, including why they are not able to effectively police institutional quality. 
A. The U.S. Department of Education 
ED is the most prominent member of the triad.61 ED “certifies institutions to 
be eligible for taxpayer-financed financial aid and oversees their administration of 
those funds.”62 Put differently, ED supplies a large percentage of all the funding 
received by American IHEs. In addition, ED also regulates which accrediting 
agencies “bear responsibility for the academic quality of the colleges they 
 
57. THOMAS HARNISCH, BARMAK NASSIRIAN, AMBER SADDLER & ART COLEMAN,  
EDUC. COMM’N STATES, ENHANCING STATE AUTHORIZATION: THE NEED FOR ACTION BY STATES 
AS STEWARDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION PERFORMANCE 2 (2016), http://www.ecs.org/wp-content/
uploads/ECS_FundingReports_HarnischNassirianSaddlerColeman_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
G97F-S2XF]. 
58. Id. at 9 (“In sum, the original decision to rely on the regulatory framework that pre-dated 
the introduction and growth of federal aid programs did not anticipate how the massive infusion of 
federal money would change the behavior of both regulators and regulated entities as the breadth of 
institutions and providers of higher education expanded.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 
(“[R]apid growth in the number of proprietary institutions in the 1980s resulted in a greater need for 
state oversight and more applications for state authorizers, but the rigor of these processes remained 
fractured across different states.”). 
59. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 6; Linehan, supra note 21 (“[E]xisting state law, 
either through public or private enforcement, does not provide proprietary schools with adequate 
incentives to implement honest, non-predatory marketing techniques, nor does it provide victimized 
students with adequate remedies when schools do employ these dishonest, predatory techniques.”). 
60. Id. at 7. 
61. Id. at 5–6 (“[A]ccrediting agencies are approved by the Education Department to bear 
responsibility for the academic quality of the colleges they accredit; the states are tasked with consumer 
protection; and the federal government, via the U.S. Department of Education, certifies institutions to 
be eligible for taxpayer-financed financial aid and oversees their administration of those funds. The 
Department also decides which accreditors meet federal standards.”). 
62. Id. 
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accredit.”63 And it has also dictated certain requirements for state authorization of 
Title IV-eligible IHEs.64  
Given its control over the purse strings, ED could be “the strongest regulator 
in the triad,” with the ability to ensure that “baseline consumer protection exists for 
all students.”65 And many have pushed ED to assume a more robust role by, for 
example, “serv[ing] as the convener and the facilitator for a sustained conversation” 
on how states could strengthen their “authorization standards and improv[e] the[ir] 
administrative and organizational processes.”66 But the Department’s current 
leadership has not shown itself willing to step up in these ways. 
While many criticized ED even before the start of the Trump administration, 
“[b]eginning in 2016, a new mood dampened the federal bureaucracy’s regulatory 
pace.”67 At this point, many believe that ED basically “abdicated its responsibility” 
to students and taxpayers by “back-tracking on what few protections do exist in the 
program integrity triad.”68 For example, ED repealed the Obama-era gainful 
employment rule,69 undefining the term “without replacing it with some new 
meaning.”70 ED has also been criticized for failing to properly oversee accrediting 
agencies.71 Secretary DeVos has also been held in contempt of court by a federal 
 
63. Id. at 6 (“The Department also decides which accreditors meet federal standards.”); see also 
LINDSEY M. BURKE & STUART M. BUTLER, HERITAGE FOUND., ACCREDITATION: REMOVING THE 
BARRIER TO HIGHER EDUCATION REFORM 6 (2012), https://www.heritage.org/education/report/ 
accreditation-removing-the-barrier-higher-education-reform [https://perma.cc/MKY8-MV3K] (“In 
order to be recognized as an approved accreditor, a prospective accrediting agency must complete a 
grueling review process overseen by DOE and the National Advisory Committee.”). 
64. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 8. 
65. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27. ED is only the strongest if you consider the 
market to be national. But, particularly since ED has stepped back its enforcement, state agencies are 
the strongest regulator in the triad in some states. 
66. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57 at 10. 
67. Shachmurove et al., supra note 42 (explaining that ED, led by Secretary DeVos has 
“displayed decreased enthusiasm for regulation and litigation,” as has the CFPB under both of its 
Trump-appointed directors); MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8 (“[C]hange is  
desperately needed.”). 
68. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 8. 
69. For a discussion of the gainful employment rule, see infra Section III.A.1. 
70. See Corey Turner, Teachers Union Lawsuit Claims DeVos ‘Capriciously’ Repealed Borrower 
Protections, NPR ( Jan. 22, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798128256/teachers-
union-lawsuit-claims-devos-capriciously-repealed-borrower-protections [https://perma.cc/9E8D-
T9JN] (“‘They just undefined the term,’ says James Kvaal, who helped design the original rule as deputy 
undersecretary in the Obama Education Department. ‘Gainful employment had meaning, and [DeVos] 
took it out. And I just — I’ve never seen that before. I’ve never seen an agency take a term that was in 
the regulations and just undefine it . . . .’”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 96–97, 
Am. Fed’n of Teachers v. DeVos, No. 5:20-cv-00455 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020) (asserting that ED acted 
“arbitrarily, capriciously, and not in accordance with law” when it repealed the gainful  
employment rule). 
71. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 14 (arguing that ED “does not have adequate 
controls” over the decision to recognize accreditors, and that ED’s oversight of accreditors once they’re 
recognized “is not adequate to ensure agencies consistently and effectively carry out their 
responsibilities”); id. at 15 (asserting that ED “has virtually no ability to police which accreditors are 
permitted to serve as gatekeepers to billions in federal dollars”). 
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judge “for failing to stop collecting loans from former students of a now-defunct 
chain of for-profit colleges.”72 
ED’s failure as a regulator of institutional quality seems primarily political in 
nature. Thus, with a new administration, ED might play a more prominent role in 
protecting students. And it should. The federal government has “a stake 
in . . . improv[ing] institutional accountability and consumer protection.”73 While 
states can play an important role, ED’s involvement may be critical to moving the 
ball forward because this effort “would require significant resources and an upfront 
investment of time and effort” to generate the necessarily “collaborative national 
effort.”74 Until there is a leadership change at ED, however, students will have to 
look elsewhere for an entity willing to protect their interests.  
B. Accrediting Agencies 
Accreditors are the second leg of the regulatory triad for IHEs and, 
traditionally, have been considered the primary IHE-quality regulator.75 Technically, 
accreditation is voluntary and there are many IHEs that are unaccredited. 
Unaccredited entities tend to be either new institutions that are not yet accredited, 
institutions that have lost their accreditation and are on their way to closing down, 
or institutions that do not intend to participate in the Title IV programs. However, 
almost all traditional two- and four-year colleges and universities are accredited by 
a regional or national accrediting agency.76 This is because accreditation is required 
of IHEs that wish to participate in the federal student loan and grant programs 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA).77 Thus, accreditation is 
effectively mandatory for most traditional two- and four-year colleges  
and universities.78  
 
72. Elissa Nadworny & Anya Kamanetz, DeVos Held in Contempt of Court for Enforcing Loans 
on Defrauded College Students, NPR (Oct. 25, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/25/
773334681/devos-held-in-contempt-of-court-ed-department-fined-100-000-in-student-loan-case 
[https://perma.cc/WPE8-3SX4]. 
73. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 10. 
74. Id.  
75. “[A]ccreditors served as the primary gatekeepers – and scapegoats – in evaluating 
institutions of higher education.” TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7; see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, 
supra note 14, at 5; BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 5 (“[B]ecause the institution is accredited, 
students can be confident that the university is operated professionally and that the courses they take 
will be of an appropriate standard.”). But see DELGADO, supra note 27, at 10 (arguing that “[a]ccreditation 
is not a sufficient substitute for rigorous state oversight”). 
76. BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 7 (“Most traditional four-year colleges and universities 
are . . . accredited by one of the six regional accrediting agencies. By contrast, most for-profit and 
technical schools are accredited by national accrediting agencies.”). 
77. See BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 5. 
78. See id. “Once a voluntary decision on the part of universities, accreditation is now a de 
facto requirement for institutions to be eligible even to open their doors or for their students to receive 
federal aid.” Id. at 8; see 1 JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 3.08[4][a] (2020) (“[A]s a practical matter, 
accreditation has become a necessity for post-secondary institutions for several fundamental reasons.”); 
see also Matthew Adam Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2017) 
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The primary role of accreditors in the triad is to ensure that the “institution 
meets certain standards of quality.”79 This role is mandated by federal law, which 
requires accrediting bodies to “develop standards in areas that tend to indicate 
school success, such as graduation and placement rates, loan default rates, curricula 
and faculty, student support services, facilities and equipment, program length, and 
recruiting and admissions practices.”80 Notably, this seemingly requires accreditors 
to consider both inputs (e.g., facilities) and outputs (e.g., graduation rates).  
Despite accreditors’ role as the academic quality-regulator,81 some believe that 
accreditors “lack effective oversight practices . . . .”82 These criticisms often center 
on the nature of an accreditor’s review, which “largely measure ‘quality’ in terms of 
inputs . . . [which are] dubious measures of an institution’s capacity.”83 A rigorous 
review of an IHE’s quality requires a focus on student outcomes, not “faculty 
credentials, facilities, and even the number of books in the library,” especially  
for reauthorization.84  
Unfortunately, accrediting agencies are unlikely to adequately protect students 
by serving as a capable steward of higher education quality. As a group, accrediting 
agencies are primarily “interested in institutional improvement and inclined against 
institutional sanctioning.”85 Yet they have been conscripted into “a high-stakes role 
 
[hereinafter Bruckner, Bankrup t i n g  H i gh e r  Edu ca t i o n ] (referring to the loss of Title IV funds as 
“an effective death sentence” for IHEs). 
79. See supra text accompanying note 65; see also Mary Watson Smith & Joshua C. Hall, Keeping 
College Pricey: The Bootlegger and Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation, 44 OKLA. CITY  
U. L. REV. 33 (2019); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[1] (“Accreditation involves a determination by an 
accrediting agency that an educational institution meets certain established standards.”). 
80. Linehan, supra note 21, at 783. 
81. See Pro. Massage Training Ctr., Inc. v. Accreditation All. of Career Schs. & Colls.,  
No. 1-12-cv-911, 2014 WL 201879, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2014) (describing accreditation as the 
“process which vets the schools and designates those which are accredited as having exceeded a certain 
threshold of quality and competency”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 781 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2015). 
82. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 14–15 (claiming that “inadequate accreditors’ 
standards are a challenge for overseeing academic quality and that accreditors lack effective oversight 
practices for academic quality” and that “accreditors have fallen short of their responsibilities”); BURKE 
& BUTLER, supra note 63, at 8 (“Even though it is a de facto requirement for colleges, accreditation does 
not guarantee academic quality.”); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[1] (“[A]ccreditation . . . is subject to some 
deserved criticism.”); DELGADO, supra note 27, at 6 (“[E]ven though regional accreditors tend to have 
more stringent standards and more diversity of membership, they, like national accreditors, tend to lack 
effective review of consumer protection issues.”). 
83. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 41, 43; see also AKERS, supra note 37, at 4 (“The current system 
of oversight for colleges in the U.S. is implicitly based on the notion that the quality of education can 
and should be measured by examining the ‘inputs’ rather than the ‘outputs.’”). 
84. Andrew P. Kelly, At Last! Promising Higher Ed Ideas from Washington, AM. ENTER. INST. 
(Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.aei.org/articles/at-last-promising-higher-ed-ideas-from-washington/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LR8-DA9Y]. 
85. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 11, 15 (explaining that accreditors “withdrew 
accreditation for only about 1 percent of accredited schools, despite there being more than 1,500 
accredited colleges with graduation rates below 40 percent.”); see also RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[3] 
(“Accreditation is a voluntary, generally nongovernmental system, peer review process for recognizing 
educational institutions for a level of performance, integrity, and quality that entitles them to the 
confidence of the educational community and the public they serve.”). 
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as . . . gatekeepers to more than $120 billion in federal dollars annually, most of 
which is borrowed by—and must be repaid by—students.”86 This is a function 
accrediting agencies are ill-suited to fulfill.87  
Because of accreditors’ predilection toward institutional improvement and 
against sanctions, “schools failing to meet accreditors’ standards could easily go a 
decade before they lose accreditation.”88 The high-stakes nature of an institution 
losing accreditation makes accreditors “reluctant to use that bludgeon.”89 Without 
more graduated penalties, such as enrollment limitations, accreditors will always be 
slow to withdraw accreditation from even the most troubling institutions. For 
example, when Corinthian Colleges collapsed in 2014, it was in good standing with 
its accreditor, the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools.90 
Corinthian remained fully accredited despite not having the financial wherewithal 
to withstand even a short interruption to its cash flow and despite investigations by 
ED and multiple attorneys general for, among other things, defrauding students by 
publishing misleading job placement rates.91 Yet both ED and states have continued 
to rely on accreditors as the stewards of higher education quality.  
C. States 
Providing an education for residents is a core function of state and local 
governments.92 No surprise then that states are the third member of the triad and 
 
86. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 11; Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 34 (arguing that 
in short, they are the “gatekeepers of these federal monies.”); see also Kelly, supra note 84 (explaining 
that the federal government provides “access to more than $150 billion in student financial aid” each 
year but largely allows “third-party accreditation agencies that are closely allied with existing higher 
education institutions” to decide which entities are eligible to receive these funds).  
87. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 13 (arguing that this role is a strange fit for them 
because “accreditors do not see themselves as regulators.”); Linehan, supra note 21, at 780 (“[T]he  
U.S. Senate reported in 1991, ‘[a]ccrediting agencies reject the idea that it is their responsibility to see 
that Title IV funds are administered properly at their schools.’”) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-58, at 17–18 
(1991)). Even worse, some suggest “that the current system of higher education accreditation acts as a 
cartel aimed at keeping the price of a college education high, with few incentives for anything beyond 
minimum quality standards.” BURKE & BUTLER, supra note 63, at 8 (“With regard to colleges and 
universities, accreditation has become, first and foremost, a barrier to entry.”); see also Zachary Maggio, 
State Policy and For-Profit Higher Education: A Comparative Case Study of Two States 174 (2018) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (arguing that some accreditors “engage in a tacit kind of 
‘quid pro quo’ approach that errs on the side of ‘rubber-stamping’ applications that come before it” 
because the accreditor “is not well empowered to engage in rigorous oversight of  
for-profit institutions”). 
88. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 16. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 13. 
91. Corinthian Colleges Student Loan Relief Eligibility, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. FOR D.C., https://
oag.dc.gov/corinthian-colleges-student-loan-relief [https://perma.cc/QJH4-VSDD] ( last visited  
Sept. 23, 2020); Information for Former Corinthian Colleges Students, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST.: XAVIER 
BECERRA ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/corinthian [https://perma.cc/YD9Z-YZLA]  
(Oct. 24, 2018).  
92. RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[2] (“[T]he Supreme Court has stated that education is one of the 
most important functions of state and local governments, and is, perhaps, at the very apex of the 
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“have played a role in the oversight of public colleges within their borders since 
the[ir] formation.”93 Thus, tradition dictates that states are primarily responsible for 
authorizing and overseeing both public and private IHEs.94 In addition, ED has 
“established minimum expectations for what qualifies as a college’s authorization 
by a state.”95 
States’ traditional role in the triad has been to “assure the legitimacy and 
integrity of institutions of higher education”96 and to protect students from fraud 
and abuse.97 States’ consumer protection role has a clear overlap with the role of 
accreditors, but they have approached the role differently. Traditionally, states have 
tried to protect students by creating “tuition recovery funds,” arranging to preserve 
student records when IHEs close and ensuring that IHEs have “basic  
operational safeguards.”98  
Most states require that the IHE be authorized99 by a state agency before they 
can operate.100 State regulatory agencies, such as California’s Bureau for Private 
 
functions of a state.”) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972)); see also Matthew A. Bruckner, Special Purpose Municipal Entities and Bankruptcy: The 
Case of Public Colleges, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 341, 365 (2020) (discussing a state’s obligation to 
educate its residents). 
93. MCCANN AND LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5 (“The 
state’s preeminent role in higher education is appropriate because, under the reserved powers clause of 
the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the provision of education is a responsibility of the 
states.”); George Gollin, Emily Lawrence & Alan Contreras, Complexities in Legislative Suppression of 
Diploma Mills, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2010) (“The state authorization requirement is in 34 
C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(1), (3). These in turn are rooted in 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), which says that an 
educational institution must be ‘legally authorized within each state to provide a program of education 
beyond secondary education.’”); RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[2] (“By tradition and law, education is a 
state function.”). 
94. Maggio, supra note 87, at 3 (“[S]tate governments have a long-standing mandate of primary 
authority and responsibility for higher education . . . .”); Linehan, supra note 21, at 785 (“[T]he 
federalism concern that education policy be controlled at the state and local level.”); BRUCE  
N. CHALOUX, STATE OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVATE AND PROPRIETARY SECTOR 4 (1985) (“[S]tates 
traditionally have been legally responsible for authorizing educational activity within state boundaries.”). 
95. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 8. 
96. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 2.  
97. Maggio, supra note 87, at 21; TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. 
98. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11.  
99. Some states use the term “authorization” to refer to “degree-granting activities and licensure 
to nondegree-granting activities, although these distinctions are not universal.” CHALOUX, supra note 
94, at 7–8. 
100. It is the license from a state to an institution of higher education that “serves as the 
fundamental formative act in the creation of postsecondary institutions and as the primary gatekeeper.” 
HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3; RAPP, supra note 78, § 3.08[3][a] (“Licensure generally refers to 
the mechanism through which states grant individuals or, in some circumstances, organizations, the 
authority to practice a restricted profession, such as operating an educational institution.”); see, e.g.,  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165A.330(l) (West 2018) (“No person shall conduct, operate, maintain, or 
establish a proprietary school . . . unless he holds a valid current license from the commission.”);  
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 141.25(1) (West 2019) (“A private career school must not maintain, advertise, 
solicit for, administer, or conduct any program in Minnesota without first obtaining a license from  
the office.”). 
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Postsecondary Education, are the primary state-based IHE regulators.101 States 
authorize IHEs in a variety of ways, either via a state charter, by exempting IHEs 
from the state authorization requirement (e.g., a religious exemption), or via 
“authorization from the state for nonpublic institutions.”102 Some states embrace 
their role in the triad with zeal.103 Others are more lax.104 For example, Reagan 
National University—an accredited IHE that appeared to have no students, no 
faculty, and no classrooms—operated out of South Dakota, which was described 
as “the ideal place for Reagan” because “[t]he state has among the laxest rules for 
colleges in the country.”105  
In recent years, states have allowed other members of the triad to drive the 
regulatory process, ceding “their role in the triad entirely to accreditors for the 
purposes of federal student aid eligibility under the HEA, permitting institutions to 
consider themselves authorized if they had obtained accreditation.”106 For example, 
South Dakota authorizes any college that is accredited—“they don’t independently 
hold universities accountable.”107 States have also deferred to the federal 
government, allowing their responsibilities to police institutional quality to be 
“subsumed in the nebulous architecture of the triad, which, in its ill-defined division 
of responsibilities, may induce each actor to assume that critical functions are 
someone else’s responsibility.”108 Finally, states have also deferred to each other 
 
101. “States provide oversight in many ways, including through higher education regulatory 
agencies, as well as through indirect means such as consumer protection and commerce laws.” Aaron 
N. Taylor, Your Results May Vary: Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through Tighter Regulation of 
Proprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729, 768 (2010); see also About the Enforcement 
Section, BUREAU FOR PRIV. POSTSECONDARY EDUC., https://www.bppe.ca.gov/enforcement/
about.shtml [https://perma.cc/NJA2-2JYQ] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 
15, at 4 (“The foundational function of the state is the approval of an entity to establish itself as a 
postsecondary institution. Most often referred to as state authorization, it is the first formal act in the 
legal operation of an institution and often serves as the foundation upon which other quality assurance 
functions are built (like accreditation).”). 
102. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3; see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19 
(“State authorization and oversight requirements also vary considerably from state to state.”). 
103. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 3 (“Some states have proven to be active and thorough 
in fulfilling this responsibility, while others have taken a passive approach with few requirements 
demanded of institutions.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 (“[R]apid growth in the number of 
proprietary institutions in the 1980s resulted in a greater need for state oversight and more applications 
for state authorizers, but the rigor of these processes remained fractured across different states.”). 
104. Id. 
105. Chris Quintana & Shelly Conlon, This College Was Accredited by a DeVos-Sanctioned 
Group. We Couldn’t Find Evidence of Students or Faculty., USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2020, 5:31 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2020/02/15/college-accreditation-department-
education-betsy-devos-south-dakota-sioux-falls/4746906002/ [https://perma.cc/6LC4-MKSG].  
106. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC.,  
LAB. & PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD 
THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 10 (2012) (“[M]any States have taken a 
passive or minimal role in approving institutions, reviewing and addressing complaints from students 
and the public, and ensuring that colleges are in compliance with State consumer protection laws.”). 
107. Quintana & Conlon, supra note 105.  
108. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4; see also DAVID A. TANDBERG & REBECCA  
R. MARTIN, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND IMPROVEMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF THE 
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through their participation in reciprocity agreements.109 Unfortunately, in recent 
years, states have become “the least consistent of the members of the program 
integrity triad.”110 
In the past, “states had to take full responsibility for the legitimacy, conduct 
and impact of institutions they authorized.”111 States were more active participants, 
in part, because “[s]tate authorization was the only public validation entities received 
before claiming collegiate status.”112 And states could take a more active role once 
more.113 For example, Tandberg, Bruecker, and Weeden wrote that states should 
“reconsider and reconceptualize how they develop and implement a state 
authorization process aimed at meeting the needs of its students as well as the 
strategic goals of the state. This is particularly true given the proliferation of new 
providers, distance education, alternative credentials, and new technologies.”114  
States should pay attention to the “variety of general outcomes  
measures—retention and graduation rates, placement and earnings data for 
program graduates, loan default or repayment rates, to name a few examples—[that] 
 
STATES 6 (2019) (“States play a fundamental role in higher education, protecting both the investment 
of state dollars and their citizens as their consumers. Despite their central responsibility in this regard, 
states have struggled with how they might help ensure that students are receiving a quality  
educational experience.”). 
109. See About NC-SARA, NC-SARA, https://www.nc-sara.org/about-nc-sara 
[https://perma.cc/F3MU-W5JU] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020). 
110. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 22. Senator Harkin helped produce a report for 
the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, which found that “[s]tate oversight of 
for-profit education companies has eroded over time due to a variety of factors, including State budget 
cuts and the influence of the for-profit college industry with State policymakers. The U.S. Department 
of Education had never defined minimum requirements for State authorization, and many States have 
taken a passive or minimal role in approving institutions, reviewing and addressing complaints from 
students and the public, and ensuring that colleges are in compliance with State consumer protection 
laws.” S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. & PENSIONS, supra note 106, at 8. 
111. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4. But see TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 (“Prior 
to the modern era, state higher education regulation had relatively little impact on postsecondary 
institutions. Private institutions were largely seen as accountable because of their religious or  
charitable affiliations.”). 
112. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 4. 
113. Linehan, supra note 21, at 785 (“Despite the expansive statutory regulatory scope of federal 
oversight programs, the non-federal arms of the ‘triad’ fail to adequately play their part as gatekeepers 
to Title IV funds.”); see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108. 
114. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4. To do so, NC-SARA may need to “be strengthened 
to facilitate the provision of quality online educational opportunities across state lines while supporting 
robust oversight structures to ensure consumer protection” because NC-SARA currently limits states’ 
authority over out-of-state distance education providers. Letter from Debbie Cochrane, Exec. Vice 
President, The Inst. for Coll. Access & Success, Clare McCann, Deputy Dir. for Fed. Pol’y, New  
Am. Higher Educ. Program, Bob Shireman, Senior Fellow, Century Found., Robyn Smith, Of Couns., 
Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. & Carrie Wofford, President, Veterans Educ. Success, to Lori Williams, 
President, Nat’l Council for State Authorization Reciprocity Agreements (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Comments-to-NC-SARA-Board-for-May-2020-Meeting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5N4-ZG9C]; see also Lindsay McKenzie, The Odd State Out, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2018/02/28/california-
holds-out-state-reciprocity-agreement-online [https://perma.cc/XF9T-RH4B]. 
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could serve as early warning signs of an institution failing to serve its students 
well.”115 States are better situated than accreditors to police institutional quality 
because state oversight “devolves decision-making power to leaders who are  
well-equipped to recognize the specific needs of their local economies and 
employers”116 because “state officials are politically accountable.”117 “[I]f the states 
took seriously their role of authorizing institutions of higher education and ensuring 
educational quality, state licensure could become an independent and meaningful 
mark of quality for consumers, employers, and other graduate institutions.”118 This 
would also make states, rather than accrediting agencies, the gatekeepers of  
federal funds.119  
The following part considers the tools available to triad members to police 
higher education institutional quality, with an eye toward considering which of these 
tools could be appropriated by state regulators interested in ensuring the 
“operational legitimacy of institutions.”120  
 
115. ANDREW P. KELLY, KEVIN J. JAMES & ROONEY COLUMBUS, INPUTS, OUTCOMES, 
QUALITY ASSURANCE: A CLOSER LOOK AT STATE OVERSIGHT OF HIGHER EDUCATION 13 (2015). 
But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 6 (“Definitions of quality in higher education are 
varied and contested, while measuring quality may be an even more difficult task”). California is 
currently the only state that could police out-of-state online schools in this way because every other 
state is a member of NC-SARA, and participants in NC-SARA have agreed not to impose additional 
“requirements on institutions from other SARA states.” About NC-SARA, supra note 109 (“As of 
April 2020, 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are members 
of SARA. Over 2,100 colleges and universities participate in SARA.”) 
116. KELLY, supra note 84. But see Linehan, supra note 21, at 782 (“While the states have 
relatively little to lose from student loan default resulting from proprietary schools’ predatory practices, 
the federal government’s monetary interest in the Title IV program may drive more effective regulation 
of proprietary school marketing and recruitment.”). 
117. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 64 (“[V]oters’ demand for higher quality and lower cost 
higher education could incentivize state officials to increase the supply by developing outcome-based 
methods of assessing an institution’s performance and by encouraging low-cost and innovative new 
educational programs. Because they are not publicly accountable—elected by traditional universities 
institutionally opposed to innovation—the accreditors have no incentive to pursue such reforms.”); see 
MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 23. 
118. See Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 62; HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (“[S]tate 
authorization should not be completely outsourced to accrediting agencies and the federal government. 
Such a complete delegation of authority would essentially render state authorization meaningless and 
non-additive.”). 
119. Smith & Hall, supra note 79, at 62; see also Maggio, supra note 87, at 3 (“[S]tate governments 
are arguably in the strongest position to enact effective regulation of the for-profit institutions operating 
within their borders.”). But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 8 (pointing out that some 
states lack an “operating definition of quality”). 
120. Instead of relying on accreditors to do this work, which both the federal government and 
the states have increasingly done. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 7. 
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III. STATES AS STEWARDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY 
A. Solutions States Could Adopt 
Most commentators that have considered how to strengthen the triad have 
focused on either accreditors or ED.121 But this Article is intended to focus on how 
states could provide greater consumer protections for in-state students.122 For too 
long, states have deferred to other members of the triad instead of taking “the lead 
in developing potential reforms or new regulatory mechanisms.”123 Some states 
have “the capacity and appetite for greater institutional oversight responsibility held 
by some actors within the state quality assurance ecosystem.”124 This Article is for 
those state higher education regulators that are eager to do more. This part presents 
a variety of regulatory solutions that states could adopt to better regulate in-state 
institutions and out-of-state schools with brick-and-mortar campuses.125 
It does so by drawing on various methods previously used by ED to police 
institutional quality and prevent students from being exploited.126 Two  
options—the gainful employment rule and cohort default rate metric—are directly 
related to improving student outcomes. The other—the financial responsibility 
scores—is about alerting students to possible school closures so that they may make 
informed decisions about which institution to attend (or whether to transfer). States 
could replicate and improve upon these methods. Each will be addressed in turn. 
1. “Gainful Employment” Rule 
In 2014, ED produced the “gainful employment rule—a regulation that holds 
career training programs accountable if loan payments represent too large a share 
 
121. See, e.g., Linehan, supra note 21, at 754 (“This Note argues that the U.S. Department of 
Education is the superior entity to police proprietary schools.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15. But 
see, e.g., HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57; MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14. 
122. This is not, by far, the only article to consider the State’s role in consumer protection, but 
it does appear to be the first law review article on the topic. Excellent coverage of this topic has been 
provided by KELLY ET AL., supra note 115; TERESA E. TAYLOR, ART COLEMAN, BETHANY LITTLE  
& AMBER SADDLER, EDUCATIONCOUNSEL, GETTING OUR HOUSE IN ORDER: CLARIFYING THE 
ROLE OF THE STATES IN HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY ASSURANCE (2016), http://
educationcounsel.com/?publication=getting-house-order-clarifying-role-state-higher-education-
quality-assurance [https://perma.cc/A3MM-7T3W]; MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 22–25; 
HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 6 (“The base of scholarly literature on the state authorization 
function remains scant with two recent exceptions.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 4 (“Given 
the state’s interest in quality education and consumer protection, to what extent is its authorization 
process advancing those goals, and what can be done to improve the authorization process to better 
advance those goals?”); TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108. 
123. Maggio, supra note 87, at 2. 
124. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 9. 
125. NC-SARA limits the ability of every state besides California to impose additional 
regulatory requirements on out-of-state IHEs that operate entirely online. See About NC-SARA,  
supra note 109.  
126. Concerns about the exploitation of students underlies a lot of policies, including some 
aspects of bankruptcy policy. See, e.g., Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, supra note 78; Bruckner, 
DNRs, supra note 4. 
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of income for students who received federal aid and finished the program of 
study.”127 The regulations were meant to “distinguish programs that provide 
affordable training that leads to well-paying jobs from programs that leave students 
with poor earnings prospects and high amounts of debt.”128 A program “passed” 
the gainful employment test if it could satisfy two debt-to-earnings ratios: graduates 
had to be able to repay their education debt by spending eight percent or less of 
their annual income or twenty percent or less of their discretionary income.129 The 
rule was also intended to force IHEs to disclose information to prospective students 
about “what the typical graduate earns, how much debt graduates have, and what 
share of graduates find employment in their field” to allow consumers to make 
more informed decisions.130 Accordingly, a state version of the gainful employment 
rule could be a useful tool to protect students from programs that require them to 
incur thousands of dollars of debt and provide little or no increased earning power. 
The federal gainful employment regulations had an immediate effect, and a 
comparable state rule might have similar results. Approximately sixty percent of the 
programs that were on track to lose access to Title IV funding because of 
unacceptable student debt-to-earnings ratios “shut down even before the rule would 
have terminated their financial aid.”131 Nevertheless, the Trump administration 
repealed the gainful employment rule, effective July 2020.132 The Trump 
 
127. BEN MILLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADUATE SCHOOL DEBT 9 (2020), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2020/01/13/479220/graduate 
-school-debt/ [https://perma.cc/4KC9-J8WK] (“That regulation defined a long-standing statutory 
requirement that certain programs and types of institutions had to show they provided training leading 
to gainful employment in a recognized occupation.”); see also Gainful Employment Information,  
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/ge [https://perma.cc/Z4BC-
USZQ] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020) (“Generally, in order to be eligible for funding under the Higher 
Education Act Title IV student assistance programs, an educational program must lead to a degree at a 
nonprofit or public institution or it must prepare students for ‘gainful employment in a  
recognized occupation.’”). 
128. DELGADO, supra note 27, at 7. 
129. 34 C.F.R. § 668.403 (2015); see also Gainful Employment Information, supra note 127; THE 
INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, WHAT TO KNOW ABOUT THE GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT RULE 
(2019), https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/what_to_know_about_GE_fact-sheet-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6V2-L7TH] (“The GE rule was based on a simple idea: typical graduates need to 
earn enough to afford to repay their loans. The rule required any program where typical graduates’ debts 
exceed both 8 percent of their total income and 20 percent of discretionary income to improve or lose 
access to federal financial aid.”); Miller, supra note 127, at 9 (Conversely, “[i]f a program fails to stay 
under the prescribed debt-to-income ratio defined in the gainful employment regulation for multiple 
years, the program loses access to federal aid.”). 
130. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, supra note 129. 
131. MILLER, supra note 127, at 10. 
132. Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, AM. COUNCIL ON 
EDUC. ( July 1, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/Department-of-Education-
Repeals-Gainful-Employment-Regulations.aspx [https://perma.cc/4YAL-QW53]; MCCANN  
& LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 31. 
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administration suggested that disclosure—via the College Scorecard—better serves 
the needs of students than the gainful employment rule.133 
A subsequent administration may reinstate the federal gainful employment 
rule regulations and the “data-matching agreement with the Social Security 
Administration that permitted the use of administrative data to calculate  
post-college earnings for such programs.”134 In addition, Congress could mandate 
such information sharing, which would make it more difficult for a future 
administration to undo.  
But states should consider implementing their own version of the gainful 
employment rule anyway.135 Hundreds of thousands of students attend or have 
attended programs that would not satisfy the federal gainful employment rule.136 
These students hold billions in debt that the gainful employment rule suggests that 
they will struggle to repay.137 Importantly, “[s]tudents of color account for more 
than half of the undergraduate enrollment at for-profit colleges, and they are 
disproportionately impacted by the high-cost, low-quality programs identified and 
addressed by the [gainful employment rule].”138 In other words, the gainful 
employment rule—like student loan debt more generally—is a racial justice issue. 
Ostensibly, ED remains committed to transparency and has therefore made 
available a significant amount of information about student outcomes vis-à-vis the 
College Scorecard.139 States could use this data to begin to create their own gainful 
employment-like rule. For example, the Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF) 
created a tool based on College Scorecard data that allows students (or regulators) 
to examine which schools produce graduates with high debt burdens relative to their 
 
133. See Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132 (“In 
announcing the decision to formally repeal the gainful employment regulations, Secretary of Education 
Betsy DeVos referred to changes to add more information to the federal College Scorecard, saying, ‘All 
schools should be clear and transparent about their outcomes and all students should have a full range 
of information available. We’re committed to making that happen.’”). 
134. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 31. 
135. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 1 (“Using longitudinal datasets, some states 
now provide their own estimates [of what students earn after college] by institution and program.”). 
136. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, supra note 129 (“More than 350,000 students 
have completed programs at schools that failed to meet the guidelines established by the GE Rule.”).  
137. Id. (“These students hold nearly $7.5 billion in student debt they are unlikely to be able  
to repay.”). 
138. Id. 
139. See Find the Right Fit, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.: COLL. SCORECARD, https://
collegescorecard.ed.gov/ [https://perma.cc/X6WP-83XL] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020); see also 
Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132. There are, however, 
substantial limitations with these data. See Why the College Scorecard Should Complement – Not Replace 
– the Gainful Employment Standards, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://
ticas.org/accountability/gainful-employment/why-the-college-scorecard-should-complement-not-
replace-the-gainful-employment-standards/ [https://perma.cc/2DC7-QQLZ] (discussing 
limitations with the College Scorecard data). 
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earnings.140 “According to TPPF’s analysis, just 73% of students at public colleges 
are enrolled in a passing program, along with 62% of those at private nonprofit 
schools. (At for-profits, the proportion is sixty-three percent.)”141  
It is possible, however, that ED would stop sharing this information if states 
began to use it to calculate their own version of the gainful employment rule because 
ED has shown itself to be hostile to this sort of outcomes-based metric. In addition, 
the data is (mostly) not program-level data and therefore is not as fine-grained as it 
could be.142 Moreover, the data is only available for less than one quarter of all 
college programs and only for graduates one year after they complete their 
education.143 Therefore, states should use their own data instead of getting this 
information from the Treasury Department.144 Since the early 2000s, states have 
begun to collect substantially more data about postsecondary students.145 For 
example, Tennessee now collects “measures of student progress and completion, 
including credit hour accumulation, transfer, graduation rates, and number of 
degrees conferred.”146 And this data is both differentiated by institution type and 
broken down into subpopulations of students, “including adult students,  
 
140. Andrew Gillen, College Earnings and Debt, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND., https://
www.texaspolicy.com/college-earnings-and-debt/ [https://perma.cc/E548-7ZQM] ( last visited 
Sept. 23, 2020); see also Cooper, supra note 25. 
141. Cooper, supra note 25. 
142. See Michael Itzkowitz, Overpromised, Underdelivered: The Limitations of the Department of 
Education’s Transparency Efforts, REALCLEAREDUCATION (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.realcleare
ducation.com/articles/2019/09/25/overpromised_underdelivered_the_limitations_of_the_ 
department_of_educations_transparency_efforts__110358.html [https://perma.cc/LJC7-8C5Q] 
(discussing limitations with the data provided by ED). 
143. Id. (“[T]he Department released as part of this effort so far are underwhelming, to say the 
least. Out of the 194,575 higher education programs across the United States, only 42,430 (22%) have 
information available on the median loan debt of graduates. Furthermore, the data that was released 
hides the outcomes of certain types of programs more than others.”). 
144. All states collect information on quarterly earnings for many (but not all) in-state workers. 
See JULIE M. WHITTAKER & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33362, UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE: PROGRAMS AND BENEFITS 6 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33362.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HZT2-44BS]; see also BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 3 (noting that some 
states have earnings data, but that data—typically from unemployment insurance programs—only 
covers people who work for an in-state employer, thus excluding various categories of people including 
the self-employed and people who leave the state); KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 3 (arguing that 
gainful employment-like measurement requires “connecting wage information from unemployment 
insurance databases to postsecondary-enrollment information”); KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra 
note 26, at 7 (“Similarly, states should take steps to link data on postsecondary experience with earnings 
and employment information. Some institutions already try to measure employment and earnings using 
graduate surveys, but these are expensive to conduct and often suffer from low response rates. Linking 
administrative data from postsecondary and wage records is likely to be more informative and less 
expensive in the long run (despite start-up costs). With these data systems in hand, states would ideally 
be able to connect average earnings to both institutions and degree programs.”); CHRISTINA 
WHITFIELD, JOHN ARMSTRONG & DUSTIN WEEDEN, STATE HIGHER EDUC. EXEC. OFFICERS 
ASS’N, STRONG FOUNDATIONS 2018: THE STATE OF STATE POSTSECONDARY DATA  
SYSTEMS (2019). 
145. See, e.g., JOHN ARMSTRONG & KATIE ZABACK, ASSESSING AND IMPROVING STATE 
POSTSECONDARY DATA SYSTEMS 4 (2016). 
146. Id. at 9. 
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low-income students, and community college students.”147 Even more recently, 
states have begun to link together students’ postsecondary and  
workforce records.148 
For now, there are substantial gaps in individual states’ data records because, 
for example, the “data they hold is highly concentrated in the public sectors.”149 
Approximately two-thirds of states do not currently collect any information from 
private nonprofit IHEs and even fewer collect information from for-profit 
IHEs.150 And in the eighteen states that do collect information from private IHEs, 
“coverage of independent institutions is often limited to those that participate in 
financial aid programs or to institutions that volunteer to submit data to the state 
postsecondary agency.”151 But this is a choice that states are making. States can and 
should demand the data they need as a condition of the school’s reauthorization.152  
Another important gap in state data records exists because workforce data is 
typically drawn from state unemployment insurance records, which exclude various 
categories of people, including those employed out of state.153 States can address 
this gap by sharing data amongst themselves, thereby gaining a more accurate 
picture of post-college earnings.154 And states have been doing just this. Whether 
 
147. Id. at 5.  
148. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 16 (“Fifty-one agencies in 46 states link or plan to 
link postsecondary and workforce data (nine agencies in nine states plan to link).”); ARMSTRONG  
& ZABACK, supra note 145, at 7 (“[C]onnections between students’ postsecondary and workforce 
records have also expanded.”); see also KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 7 (providing 
examples from Florida, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, and Colorado, and describing these states as 
“leading the way in linking unemployment insurance and postsecondary records and reporting  
those data”). 
149. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 8. Another important gap is in state workforce 
records, which typically come from state unemployment insurance records. See supra note 144. These 
records only cover people who work for an in-state employer, excluding various categories of people 
including the self-employed, people who leave the state, people who work for the federal government 
and others. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 4. 
150. WHITFIELD ET AL., supra note 144, at 8 (“Roughly one-third of respondents indicated they 
collect information from institutions in other sectors: 18 agencies collected information from 
independent (private, nonprofit) institutions, 12 from proprietary (private, for-profit) institutions, and 
three from tribal institutions.”); ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 1 (“Only 18 states surveyed 
by State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) collected information from private,  
not-for-profit institutions.”). 
151. ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 7–8. 
152. For example, California has taken its first steps toward creating a state-level,  
gainful-employment rule in California Assembly Bill 1340, which “would require an institution subject 
to the act to collect and retain for each graduate completing a program at that institution on or after 
January 1, 2020, individual identifying information, the program the graduate was enrolled in, and 
specified student loan debt information.” Assemb. B. 1340, 2019-2020 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
153. See Department of Education Repeals Gainful Employment Regulations, supra note 132; 
ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 2 (“Often, unemployment insurance records are used to 
determine wage outcomes of graduates.”); see also supra text accompanying note 149 (noting other 
limitations with this data). 
154. “Colorado, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin have partnered with the LEHD program at 
the US Census Bureau to develop nationwide earnings data for students who leave postsecondary 
institutions.” BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that using only one state’s data may 
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by entering into memoranda of understanding between state agencies or developing 
data sharing agreements, more than half of the states now share these types of data 
with each other.155 There are regional data sharing arrangements as well. For 
example, Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington share data with each other 
through the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education’s Multistate 
Longitudinal Data Exchange to better understand outcomes for students who cross 
state lines.156 While multistate information-sharing agreements are more 
administratively cumbersome (and expensive) than using the Treasury 
Department’s data, it creates the potential for an end run of a recalcitrant  
federal government.157  
2. Cohort Default Rates 
As noted above, more than one million student loan borrowers default on 
their federal student loans each year.158 These defaults occur despite an exceedingly 
generous definition of default.159 The Cohort Default Rate (CDR) is a consumer 
protection measure designed to shield students from extremely low-quality IHEs 
and stop the flow of tax dollars to these institutions.160 IHEs are ineligible to receive 
federal financial aid if they have three consecutive default rates that exceed thirty 
percent.161 The CDR is the only financial outcome-based metric used by ED to 
assess institutional quality.162  
 
bias earnings data downwards because “students who move out of state may be more likely to earn 
more than those who do not move”); ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 2 (“[M]ore  
cross-state collaboration could improve the quality of reporting on student workforce outcomes.”).  
 While there are some privacy-focused concerns with this approach, states appear to be 
comfortable with what they can and cannot share. See ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 11 
(“Addressing privacy related to education data is particularly challenging because there is significant 
variation in privacy laws across both sectors and states.”). 
155. Slightly more than half the states reportedly “house data from various government agencies 
in a central warehouse.” ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 5. 
156. Id. at 6. 
157. See BLAGG & WASHINGTON, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that some “states are partnering 
with nearby states to follow residents when they move or take jobs in a neighboring state”). 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
159. See infra text accompanying note 164. 
160. See Michael Itzkowitz, Why the Cohort Default Rate Is Insufficient, THIRD WAY (Nov. 7, 
2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/why-the-cohort-default-rate-is-insufficient [https:// 
perma.cc/F8GR-R3UW] (discussing how the CDR was intended to protect students from “low-
performing providers” and “bad actors”); see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27 (explaining 
that the CDR “was designed to penalize colleges where a disproportionate share of borrowers default 
on their loans”).  
161. Or a single year with a CDR of greater than 40%. See Itzkowitz, supra note 147 (citing 34 
C.F.R. § 668.206 (2011)); see also MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 27. The FY 2017 national 
cohort default rate was 9.7%. Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, FED. STUDENT AID, https://
www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/cdr.html [https://perma.cc/G77A-PDGQ] 
(Aug. 27, 2020). 
162. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“The only current financial outcome used to assess the quality 
of institutions that are eligible for federal aid is the cohort default rate.”). 
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Unfortunately, the CDR metric is broken. ED’s ability to identify and remove 
IHEs from Title IV eligibility using the CDR metric has been diminished by an 
outdated definition of default.163 While many borrowers are seriously behind on 
their payments, a student loan is not technically in default until it has gone between 
270 and 360 days in nonrepayment.164 In many cases, borrowers can make no 
payments on their student loan debt and still not be in default.165 As a result, while 
only slightly more than half of all student loan debt is in active repayment, the 
official student loan default rate is merely 11.5%.166 To put this number in context, 
even with such a generous definition, the official “student loan default rate is higher 
than the default rate for auto loans,”167 and exceeds the rate of delinquent mortgages 
“during the peak of the housing crisis in 2010.”168  
Simply put, the definition of “default” does not appropriately account for 
students who are in forbearance, have a deferment, or use an income-driven 
repayment plan.169 While these programs and grace periods are valuable, excluding 
them from the definition of default allows IHEs to remain eligible for Title IV even 
though most of their students would—objectively—be considered to struggle with 
their educational debts.170 For example, at almost 500 institutions “less than  
 
163. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2001), which defines default as: 
The failure of a borrower and endorser, if any, or joint borrowers on a PLUS or Consolidation 
loan, to make an installment payment when due, or to meet other terms of the promissory note, 
the Act, or regulations as applicable, if the Secretary or guaranty agency finds it reasonable to 
conclude that the borrower and endorser, if any, no longer intend to honor the obligation to repay, 
provided that this failure persists for— 
 (1) 270 days for a loan repayable in monthly installments; or 
 (2) 330 days for a loan repayable in less frequent installments. 
Cf. Cohort Default Rates, FINAID, https://www.finaid.org/loans/cohortdefaultrates.phtml 
[https://perma.cc/2KA7-EHS2] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020); MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 
29 (“[I]ts utility in identifying poor-performing schools and removing them from the federal aid 
program has continued to decline.”); Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (claiming that “[t]he implementation of 
the initial CDR law was extremely effective, leading to a significant decline in defaults across the 
country” and “a significant number of fly-by-night institutions failed the CDR test, lost access to federal 
funding, and closed down . . . [which is] exactly what the CDR is supposed to do”). 
164. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200(b) (2001); see also Bruckner et al., No-Contest, supra note 44, at 189 n.25; 
Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (defining default as a borrower’s inability “to make a single payment on their 
loans within the past 360 days”). 
165. See Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (discussing $0 income-driven repayment (IDR) plans). 
166. See Flynn, supra note 40. While “the reported default rate for federally managed loans is 
11.5 percent . . . , the true default rate is actually more than 17 percent.” Id. at 3. These figures do not 
include private student loans, which have higher repayment rates than federal student loans. The rest is 
in some form of grace period, such as forbearance or deferment, an income-driven repayment plan, or 
in default. See id.  
167. Bruckner et al., No-Contest, supra note 44, at 189 n.25 (citing Ben Miller, Who Are Student 
Loan Defaulters?, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.american 
progress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/ 
[https://perma.cc/GA3E-TK7H]). 
168. Itzkowitz, supra note 160. 
169. See id. 
170. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30 (claiming that “[c]olleges that left the majority 
of their students struggling to repay, though not defaulting, were able to skirt accountability” and 
reporting that “[l]ast year alone, $25.4 billion in federal loans were in deferment due to economic 
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one-quarter of their students had successfully begun to pay down their loans within 
three years of leaving school and beginning repayment.”171 Some have even accused 
IHEs of manipulating their repayment statistics to avoid a failing CDR score.172  
Thus, it appears that the definition of default needs to be amended if the CDR 
metric is to be useful for protecting students from IHEs with poor outcomes.173 
Any metric that faults only ten IHEs a year—like the CDR—even though there are 
three times as many IHEs (thirty-two) “where less than one in 10 students were able 
to pay down $1 of their loan principal within three years of leaving” is a flawed 
metric.174 There may not be political will at the federal level for this redefinition 
exercise,175 but there’s no reason why states could not adopt their own CDR rules 
for use in their own (re)authorization decisions. They could, for example, use loan 
repayment rates measuring “the percentage of borrowers who succeed in lowering 
their loan balance over a given period of time.”176 States “should also institute 
program-level accountability based on graduates’ debt relative to their incomes, 
even at nonprofit and public degree-granting institutions.”177  
Unfortunately, if the definition of “default” was amended at the state level, it 
may make it harder for states to obtain the data they need because ED won’t simply 
be able to share what they have. However, ED does have (and currently shares) data 
 
hardship” and “even though these students are struggling financially, they do not count negatively 
against an institution’s CDR”). 
171. Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (discussing data from 2014–2015). 
172. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“While the cohort default rate is designed to capture the ability 
of graduates to repay their debts, it falls short because colleges manipulate repayment statistics by 
encouraging students to enroll in programs that postpone repayment. Student borrowers can use a 
variety of tactics to avoid having their loan enter default while still failing to make any progress in paying 
down their balance.”); Itzkowitz, supra note 160 (claiming that some IHEs use 
“unscrupulous . . . default prevention strategies” to avoid failing the CDR metric and that ED is aware 
that its metric is “susceptible to gaming behavior”). 
173. See MILLER, supra note 127, at 12 (“Rather than capping debt based on the earnings of 
completers, graduate programs could instead be held accountable if many students are unable to repay 
their debts or are heavily reliant on options such as IDR, which sets payments at a share of income.”); 
Robert Kelchen, How Well Do Default Rates Reflect Student Loan Repayment?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 30, 
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2015/09/30/how-well-do-
default-rates-reflect-student-loan-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/HA86-FTLM] (“All of these 
complications make cohort default rates a weak metric of whether students are actually paying back 
their loans.”). 
 Another flaw with the CDR metric, not otherwise addressed in this Article, is that the CDR data 
is old data. For example, “[t]he FY 2017 official cohort default rates were delivered to both domestic 
and foreign schools on September 28, 2020.” Official Cohort Default Rates for Schools, supra note 161. 
174. See Itzkowitz, supra note 160. 
175. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30 (“House Republican and Democratic bills 
introduced this year both sought to incorporate a measure of delinquency to the existing default 
rate . . . .”). 
176. AKERS, supra note 37, at 5 (“The advantage of this metric is that it reveals when borrowers 
don’t make progress in paying down their loans because they are eligible for programs that postpone 
payments without causing their loan to be reported as delinquent.”). 
177. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 35; see also Itzkowitz, supra note 21 (discussing a 
value-added measure of higher education quality). 
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on repayment rates via the College Scorecard.178 It is not clear, though, whether ED 
would continue to share this data if states were using it to calculate their own CDR 
rates. This would be a substantial impediment to state implementation of a revised 
CDR-like metric because most of this data is only collected by student  
loan servicers.179 
3. Financial Responsibility Rules 
Through its Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), ED measures the financial 
health of IHEs using its financial responsibility score.180 “Colleges are scored on a 
scale from -1.0 to 3.0.”181 IHEs need a score a 1.0 or better to participate in any 
Title IV programs,182 though an IHE is subject to heightened scrutiny if it scores 
between 1.0 and 1.4.183 In academic year 2016–17, more than ten percent of IHEs 
either received a failing score or were subject to additional oversight.184  
There are three problems with the current financial responsibility metric. First, 
these scores are not a particularly useful way to analyze an IHE’s current financial 
health because they rely on old data.185 The scores are based on IHE’s audited 
 
178. ED shares data on the percent of undergraduate students reducing their original principal 
balance over a three-year, backwards-looking period. See Download the Data, U.S. DEP’T  
EDUC.: COLL. SCORECARD, https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/data/ [https://perma.cc/ALN2-
YDV4] (June 1, 2020). This data is limited by ED decision to suppress this information at schools with 
cohorts of fewer than thirty students because of accuracy concerns. See TECHNICAL 
DOCUMENTATION: COLLEGE SCORECARD INSTITUTION-LEVEL DATA 24 (2020), https://
collegescorecard.ed.gov/assets/FullDataDocumentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2BE-9YVQ] 
(“Data are also suppressed for institutions with fewer than 30 students, where the outcome of a single 
student could dramatically change the rate.”). 
179. However, states could use their authority to license student loan servicers to impose data 
collection obligations on them. E.g., H.B. 10, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (imposing a 
wide range of obligations on student loan servicers before they can operate in Virginia); cf. infra text 
accompanying notes 231–33. 
180. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30; Robert Kelchen, Which Colleges Failed the 
Latest Financial Responsibility Test?, ROBERT KELCHEN (Apr. 15, 2019), https://robertkelchen.com/
2019/04/15/which-colleges-failed-the-latest-financial-responsibility-test/ [https://perma.cc/ 
876X-6R59]. 
181. Kelchen, supra note 173; see also Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, FED. STUDENT 
AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/composite-scores [https://perma.cc/DJU8-2YHK] 
( last visited Sept. 23, 2020). 
182. 34 C.F.R. § 668.15(a) (2000); Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, supra note 181; see 
also 2 FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK: 2019–2020, 
at 89 (2020) [hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK ], https://ifap.ed.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
2020-01/1920FSAHbkVol2Ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNY8-URDZ] (“To participate in the FSA 
programs, a school must demonstrate that it is financially responsible.”). 
183. Kelchen, supra note 180; Financial Responsibility Composite Scores, supra note 181 (“The 
overall relative financial health of institutions [falls] along a scale from negative 1.0 to positive 3.0. A 
score greater than or equal to 1.5 indicates the institution is considered financially responsible.”). 
184. Kelchen, supra note 180. 
185. Id. (“The data are already three years old, which is an eternity for a college on the brink of 
collapse (but perhaps not awful for a cash-strapped nonprofit college with a strong will to live on).”); 
FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182, at 89 (“[S]chools are required to submit financial information to the 
Department every year. A school must provide this financial information in the form of an audited 
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financial statements, which aren’t due until six to nine months after the school’s 
fiscal year ends.186 Thus, an IHE that encounters a significant financial shock early 
in its fiscal year might not share that information with FSA for more than eighteen 
months. At that point, it is often far too late regulators to act. For example, almost 
as soon as ED announced that it would delay providing Title IV funds to Corinthian 
Colleges for a mere three weeks, the for-profit chain of colleges announced it would 
sell or close its campuses and operations.187 Without current data, it’s no wonder 
that the FSA “has failed to keep up with the scale and scope of problems in higher 
education around the country.”188  
But the FSA processes could be improved.189 First, the federal government 
(or states if the federal government won’t act) could require more current 
information.190 For example, IHEs could be required to promptly report “steep 
declines in enrollment and tuition revenues (which can be an indicator of financial 
problems).”191 Additionally, IHEs could be required to report if they fail to pay a 
 
financial statement as part of a combined submission that also includes the school’s compliance audit. 
For-profit schools have six months from the end of the schools’ fiscal year to provide the combined 
submission; other schools have nine months.”). 
186. FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182. But at least this data is considered by ED. States do not 
universally require IHEs to annually submit audited financial statements. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 
15, at 21 (“For existing institutions and those seeking renewal, authorizers ought to require the annual 
submission of audited financial statements and any additional financial information they need to 
measure the financial viability of the institutions and to ensure they are operating in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations.”). 
187. Jose Luis Magana, School Daze: Students at Troubled Corinthian Colleges Say They’re in the 
Dark, NBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014, 9:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/education/school-
daze-students-troubled-corinthian-colleges-say-theyre-dark-n190456 [https://perma.cc/78M2-2FCY] 
(“In early July, Corinthian announced it would be selling or closing its 107 campuses and online 
operations. The announcement came after the Department of Education withheld Corinthian’s Pell 
grants and loan funds for 21 days, claiming the company was taking too long with a request for detailed 
records of their students’ performance.”). 
188. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 30. 
189. Id. at 31 (“FSA’s processes have proven wholly inadequate to respond to—or better yet, 
prevent—the abuse of federal dollars and prevalence of poor performing colleges in the system.”); Rick 
Seltzer, Regulating College Closures, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Seltzer, Regulating ], 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/23/massachusetts-regulators-propose-efforts-
protect-students-unexpected-college [https://perma.cc/QTM4-FU5E] (“[E]xisting metrics that could 
mark stressed institutions, like the federal government’s Financial Responsibility Composite Score, have 
failed to identify problems with colleges and universities in the years leading up to their closure and 
have sometimes flagged colleges with considerable resources.”). 
190. Rick Seltzer, What to Know About Lists of Financially Challenged Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Nov. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Seltzer, Lists ], https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/11/01/
publishing-colleges-financial-information-has-long-history-and-raises-larger-set [https://perma.cc/ 
A97E-28QV] (“More recently, the idea of publishing financial evaluations became a hot topic at the 
state level. After Mount Ida College suddenly collapsed in 2018 . . . officials in Massachusetts started 
looking into new state requirements designed to prevent colleges from closing without warning 
students. . . . At the beginning of this year, Massachusetts regulators moved to screen all private 
nonprofit colleges’ finances and warn students one and a half years before their colleges were at risk 
of closing.”). 
191. Robert Kelchen & Kenneth Megan, Another University Is Imploding. The Federal 
Government Must Do More, ROLL CALL (Mar. 11, 2019, 5:04 AM), https:// 
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debt when it is due (or even if it anticipates not paying a debt when it becomes 
due).192 Similarly, IHEs could be forced to promptly disclose actual or anticipated 
lawsuits involving a material sum.193 Regulators might have differing views as to 
exactly which information to require, but “[i]t turns out this is not rocket science.”194 
“Those who know what to look for probably already have a good idea of the 
colleges and universities that are in financial trouble. It’s often institutions that are 
starting to spend more than they collect.”195 
In other words, regulators need to collect a broader array of data related to an 
IHE’s potential financial distress and to collect that data in a more timely fashion.196 
IHEs, like public companies, could be required to timely report any significant news 
likely to affect their financial future.197 Like IHEs, public companies are required to 
file annual financial reports (known as 10-Ks).198 But public companies are also 
required to file quarterly updates (10-Q reports) and to provide extremely prompt 
updates upon the happening of certain significant events (8-Ks).199 Unlike with 
disclosures by public companies, disclosures by IHEs need not be made public but 
could be provided only to regulators. These changes to the financial responsibility 
 
www.rollcall.com/2019/03/11/another-university-is-imploding-the-federal-government-must-do-more/ 
[https://perma.cc/WS5E-UP3F] (calling on the federal government to collect such information 
“quarterly, improving timeliness and providing regulators with better information on institutions with 
deteriorating financial health”); see also Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190 (highlighting another important 
piece of information: when an IHE’s net expenses are expected to exceed its net assets); Seltzer, 
Regulating, supra note 189 (“Working group documents[, which are located at https://
www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/03e_THESIS%20Deck.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6UZQ-RXA8],] indicate that 24 percent of private nonprofit four-year institutions in the 
state experienced enrollment decreases of 10 percent or more between 2011 and 2016.”). 
192. Both of these are salient to the Secretary of Education’s determination of whether an IHE 
is financially responsible. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.15(b) (2000) (“In general, the Secretary considers an 
institution to be financially responsible only if it . . . (4) Is current in its debt payments. The institution 
is not considered current in its debt payments if—(i) The institution is in violation of any existing loan 
agreement at its fiscal year end, as disclosed in a note to its audited financial statement; or (ii) the 
institution fails to make a payment in accordance with existing debt obligations for more than 120 days, 
and at least one creditor has filed suit to recover those funds.”). 
193. Id.  
194. Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190.  
195. Id.  
196. “[U]pdates should be made speedily and narrowly.” MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, 
at 34; see also WORKING GRP., MASS. DEP’T OF HIGHER EDUC., FINAL REPORT  
& RECOMMENDATIONS, TRANSITIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS 
OF STUDENTS (THESIS) 7 (2019) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP documents], https://www.inside 
highered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/THESIS%20Working%20Group%20Final%20 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2GN-MTF8] (noting the need “to significantly improve on the 
timeliness of awareness of growing risk at specific” IHEs). 
197. “Colleges should be required to report in a timely manner when they experience significant 
financial risks.” MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34. 
198. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting [https://perma.cc/Q9F6-4NUL] 
(Oct. 24, 2018); FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 182.  
199. Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, supra note 198. 
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rules could help by informing regulators when an event occurs that creates a 
“significant risk of closure or other liabilities owed to the federal government.”200  
Second, FSA is also an (overly) cautious regulator. There are various reasons 
for this caution, including that “FSA has been underfunded” and understaffed.201 
Nor has the FSA been “empowered to take more, stronger, and swifter action when 
it finds concerning indicators.”202 “Oversight of colleges is not among FSA’s stated 
goals in the law.”203 As a result, “FSA typically acts out of an overabundance of 
caution, waiting until problems are too far along before taking serious action. And 
lengthy due process requirements for colleges make it difficult for FSA to take 
action early, subjecting students to harm for a longer period of time.”204 Thus, a 
state regulator empowered to act on concerning financial responsibility scores 
might be an effective strategy for protecting students. 
In response to Mount Ida’s precipitous collapse in 2018, the Massachusetts 
Board of Higher Education convened its Working Group in early 2019.205 This 
Working Group determined that the “existing regulators . . . and existing metrics 
[were] insufficient to provide early enough warning or action.”206 In response, it 
proposed to “screen all private nonprofit colleges’ finances and warn students one 
and a half years before their colleges were at risk of closing.”207 The goal is to define 
a threshold at which an IHE’s financial condition creates a “meaningful risk of 
interruption” for students, triggering the need to notify students and prepare a 
contingency plan for the institution.208 And the information used to calculate a risk 
score is based exclusively on “existing, publicly reported data and requires no 
further information from colleges.”209 
 
200. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34. 
201. Id. at 32. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 31. 
205. See Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190. 
206. WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 1. 
207. Seltzer, Lists, supra note 190; KASIA LUNDY, HAVEN LADD & ALI HUBERLIE, ERNST  
& YOUNG-PARTHENON, TRANSITIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (2018), https://www.mass.edu/
strategic/documents/EY-Parthenon%20Transitions%20in%20Higher%20Ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BW2R-3TFT] (describing the Teachout Viability Metric as a method for assessing whether an 
institution has sufficient financial resources to teach out current students through to graduation on its 
own campus). 
208. “The proposed plan centers on a clear goal – to ensure that any college that reaches a 
defined threshold where its financial condition puts current and recently admitted students at 
meaningful risk of interruption in their educations must prepare necessary contingency plans and must 
inform the students and other stakeholders when that risk becomes sufficiently imminent.” WORKING 
GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 1; see also Seltzer, Regulating, supra note 189. 
209. WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196, at 2. While many of these data are available 
publicly, most of them have never been combined to create a metric that takes into account financial 
information, enrollment information, and a host of other factors. Id. This is not meant to undermine 
my earlier claim that updated information would be better information. Rather, I mean to suggest only 
that we need not wait for better information before acting.  
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Finally, a related problem is that colleges experiencing significant financial 
risks are not forced to protect taxpayers by, among other things, having sufficiently 
large letters of credit on file.210 Letters of credit are rarely required and usually too 
small “to cover the entirety of the closed-school discharge liabilities” even when 
they are in place.211 Less than one in ten closed institutions with more than “$1 
million in closed-school discharge liabilities” had a letter of credit on file.212 Better 
disclosures could help ensure that more IHEs have appropriately large letters of 
credit to protect taxpayers when other measures are insufficient.213  
B. Mechanisms to Improve Institutional Quality 
There are several mechanisms by which states could protect students from 
low-value or exploitative IHEs. One is through their power to authorize businesses 
operating in their state (whether with a brick-and-mortar or a virtual presence).214 
State authorization has traditionally been used as a stick to punish bad actors. But 
instead of authorization being a binary option (an entity is authorized and can 
operate, or it does not and cannot), a broader array of authorizations could be 
offered. For instance, authorization may be subject to various restrictions, 
restrictions akin to endorsements on an individual’s driver license. Just like a person 
needs to satisfy different requirements to be licensed to drive a motorcycle rather 
than a car, IHEs might apply for various endorsements if they want to expand 
operations to a new location, accept significantly more students, or similar changes.  
Other mechanisms to compel IHEs to protect students include the use of 
tuition-assistance grants for students and performance-based funding for public 
IHEs. These mechanisms can serve as a carrot to go along with the stick of 
threatening to terminate an IHE’s authorization or deny it an endorsement. By 
 
210. Cf. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (discussing the surety bond requirement that most 
higher education boards require but noting that they tend to be small, $500,000 at the high end and 
only $10,000 at the low end); AKERS, supra note 37 (suggesting that risk-sharing payments might be 
used to protect taxpayers).  
211. MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 34 (reporting that of the “62 institutions that 
closed between 1987 and 2016 and had over $1 million in closed-school discharge liabilities—just six 
institutions had letters of credit on file, and only one had a letter of credit large enough to cover the 
entirety of the closed-school discharge liabilities”). 
212. Id.  
213. Maggio, supra note 87, at 172 (“[T]he total amount of the fund and the amounts awarded 
to students on an annual basis are minimal considering the size of the state’s enrollment.”). 
214. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 2 (“Authorization in a state is typically required if an 
institution is deemed to have a ‘physical presence’ in the state—a definition that hinges on certain types 
of activities, such as advertising to students, employing faculty, or providing on-the-ground services.”); 
see also CHALOUX, supra note 94, at 8 (“States use a variety of approaches in licensing and authorizing 
institutions to operate and grant degrees in their jurisdictions.”); HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5 
(“Authorization is usually required if an institution has a ‘physical presence’ in the state, a definition 
that can be triggered based on a range of activities, such as employing faculty or advertising to 
students.”). But cf. NC-SARA, supra note 125 (noting that NC-SARA substantially limits states’ ability 
to impose additional regulations on entities that do not have a physical presence in the state (e.g., operate 
entirely online)). 
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offering additional funds only to IHEs that meet certain performance-based criteria, 
states can push IHEs to improve student outcomes.215 
1. State Authorization 
States have well-established authority to regulate IHEs.216 State authorization 
is both required by federal law and prudent as a matter of public policy.217 States 
can leverage an IHE’s need for state authorization to protect students at two  
stages: when they first authorize an IHE and when the IHE needs to renew its 
authorization.218 “The establishment—and continuous approval process—places 
tremendous responsibility on the state to assure that new and existing institutions 
are capable of meeting their educational missions and are operating in the best 
interests of their students and the state.”219 This places state policymakers in a 
powerful position to protect students by shaping the higher  
education marketplace.220  
a. Initial Authorization 
States’ approaches to setting initial authorization requirements vary. Some 
states have required only that an IHE be properly incorporated or accredited to be 
authorized to operate.221 Obviously, this provides very little protection for students 
and does not represent a state’s embrace of its “powerful position.”222 By contrast, 
other states use “a comprehensive authorization and renewal process that evaluates 
 
215. “The report acknowledges that some colleges and universities could resist the process 
proposed. It suggests making them ineligible for state student financial aid if they do not agree to the 
plan, a considerable penalty in a state with meaningful grants for state residents who enroll at private 
colleges.” Seltzer, Regulating, supra note 189; see also WORKING GROUP documents, supra note 196 
(discussing the tethering of active monitoring to continued access to state financial aid and that “[i]t is 
fair and appropriate for Massachusetts to place such strings upon publicly financed aid provided  
to schools”). 
216. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 7 (“[The] few court cases related to the state’s power 
to authorize institutions . . . [provide] enough case law to establish a clear state authority to authorize 
colleges and universities within its borders.”). 
217. 34 C.F.R. § 600.2 (2011); Linehan, supra note 21, at 783 (“Under the present system, federal 
law requires states to designate one or more administrative bodies to furnish school licensing 
information, to notify the Department upon revocation of a school’s operating license, and notify the 
Department when it has ‘credible evidence’ that a school has committed fraud in the administration of 
federal student loans or has otherwise violated federal loan eligibility rules.”). 
218. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (“Clearly, the state authorization process should be 
most comprehensive for entities seeking institutional status for the first time. This, as has been pointed 
out, is the stage where few other quality assurance or regulatory mechanisms have reviewed the entity, 
where little by way of data or track record tends to be available, and where the state must single-handedly 
make a determination of legitimacy. But even the most robust upfront vetting process must be paired 
with a regime of continuing, and appropriate, oversight to ensure that institutional performance does 
satisfy the states’ baseline requirements.”). 
219. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5. 
220. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 2. 
221. See HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5 (“For some states, simple incorporation has been 
deemed sufficient to declare an institution as legitimate.”); supra text accompanying note 94. 
222. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 2. 
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a wide array of inputs and outcomes.”223 The latter approach is the only one that 
can protect students. 
In particular, states are the only entity that regulates unaccredited institutions 
that do not receive Title IV funding, such as coding bootcamps.224 These  
state-authorized, unaccredited institutions “represent an often-overlooked but 
important segment of American higher education.”225 It is important that states 
closely examine these institutions and “ensure that [students] are receiving a quality 
education, as protections offered by accreditation and federal oversight [such as 
they are] are unavailable.”226 
Before initially authorizing their operations, states are well positioned to 
evaluate whether IHEs are likely to provide students with a good-value education. 
At this point, of course, state regulators are likely limited to evaluating the IHE’s 
plans for educating students and the resources it intends to devote to the endeavor. 
For example, states can assess “whether an entity has the expected internal resources 
to deliver educational services—the classroom and course-inventories, the number 
of faculty, and the general material and human resources necessary to perform as a 
school.”227 And states already collect “lots of information about inputs,” such as 
professors’ CVs, “student-faculty ratios,” school “floor plans, site plans, blueprints, 
or square footage of facilities,” evidence of “appropriate equipment for students 
and instructors,” and information “related to content and academic programs.”228 
 
223. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 5. 
224. See, e.g., Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Running Without State Approval, Lambda School Shows 
Challenge of Regulating New Entities, EDUC. DIVE ( Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.educationdive.com/
news/running-without-state-approval-lambda-school-shows-challenge-of-regulating/570906/ 
[https://perma.cc/SY8J-N5QN] (discussing coding bootcamp, the Lambda School, which “has not 
been approved as an educational entity in [California],” is not accredited, and does not accept Title IV 
funds); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 20 (“[N]ew providers of alternative credentials . . . do not 
seek accreditation or access to federal student financial aid and therefore operate outside of the 
traditional regulatory triad. These entities operate boot camps, badging services, and the like, and are 
often for-profit entities that should require regulation and authorization in order to ensure some level 
of quality and consumer protection.”). 
225. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 12 (“The growth and dominance of Title IV 
participating postsecondary institutions has so dominated current thinking about state authorization 
that policymakers often assume a rapid progression through state authorization to accreditation and 
federal certification. A large number of credential-granting institutions, however, choose to operate 
with nothing more than state authorization, and a number of these may even access public subsidies 
through other agencies. State authorization serves as the only mechanism of establishing legitimacy and 
assuring quality for such institutions.”); see also Bauer-Wolf, supra note 224 (highlighting a regulatory 
disconnection in California between the California Attorney General office and “the government 
agency that authorizes private institutions there, the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education 
(BPPE)”). 
226. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 12. 
227. Id. at 5. 
228. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 7–8; see also Marilyn C. Kameen & Manuel J. Justiz, Using 
Assessment in Higher Education to Improve Success for Minority Students, 66 PEABODY J. EDUC. 46, 49 
(1988) (“Until recently, ‘input’ measures such as mean Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of entering 
students, number of books in the library, and percentage of faculty with terminal degrees, were used to 
measure institutional quality. Little has been said, however, about the ability of the institution to 
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States might systemize which information they collect229 and ensure that 
authorization decisions are taken seriously by, for example, adequately funding the 
office that authorizes new IHEs.230 
b. Renewed Authorization 
States generally required IHEs to renew their authorization ever year or two.231 
Although they are limited to focusing on proposed inputs at the initial authorization 
stage, at the authorization renewal stage, states should base their decisions on actual 
student outcomes.232 States should mandate that all IHEs provide them with data 
about “graduation rates, completions, student licensure/certification success rates, 
job placement rates, and loan repayment and default rates, among other metrics.”233 
With this information, states could produce their own versions of CDRs, financial 
responsibility scores, and gainful employment rule to decide whether an IHE is 
providing a good value to its students.234 Collecting and using information about 
student outcomes is important for deciding whether an IHE should be allowed to 
continue operating.235 Unfortunately, this is not always the case.236 For example, in 
 
influence student learning and development. To focus on ‘results’ and ask questions about ‘output’ 
requires far more serious and systematic approaches to defining and assessing learning outcomes.”). 
229. HARNISCH ET AL., supra note 57, at 11 (arguing that states should “enable the creation of 
a common matrix of ‘institutional vital signs,’ a set of quantitative metrics that would allow regulators 
to focus their limited resources on institutions that pose the greatest risk to students and other 
stakeholders. Items such as default rates, graduation rates, recorded consumer complaints, and certain 
financial indicators could quickly direct more expansive and more comprehensive oversight to venues 
where that might be needed more urgently.”). 
230. Cf. Maggio, supra note 87, at 171 (reviewing one accreditor’s records—ASBPPE—showed 
that the accreditor “is exceedingly generous in approving new licensure and program approval requests” 
with no recorded rejections during the period of time studied). 
231. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (“[R]enewals [are] generally required every one to two 
years.”); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13 (“Seven states do not require regular reauthorization 
or exempt some types of institutions from regular reauthorization. The frequency with which 
institutions must renew their authorization varies by state, and it also varies within a state based on the 
type of institution. Typically, in-state institutions are authorized for longer time periods, while  
out-of-state institutions are required to renew their authorization more frequently. Most reauthorization 
approvals hinge on maintenance of accreditation and fiscal viability; fewer states assess student 
outcomes during the renewal process.”). 
232. States can help ensure institutional capacity by collecting data, information, and assurances. 
TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 5; TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 15 (“The need to 
collect and address student learning outcomes was a topic of great interest and discussion at both 
convenings.”). 
233. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 19; TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 14. 
234. For an alternative measure of how to evaluate whether IHEs are providing a good value 
for students, see Itzkowitz, supra note 21.  
235. “The establishment—and continuous approval process—places tremendous responsibility 
on the state to assure that new and existing institutions are capable of meeting their educational missions 
and are operating in the best interests of their students and the state.” TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 
15, at 5; see also TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108. 
236. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115 (highlighting the variety of approaches across states and 
institution types). 
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Arizona, “there is little cost to entry and few rules to play by.”237 And Arizona 
“doesn’t require [IHEs] to account for particular outcomes in order to 
participate.”238 
Only about half of state IHEs supervisors even require institutions “to report 
some measure of student outcomes.”239 But even in states that require such 
reporting, there is some evidence to suggest that this information is not used 
rigorously to decide whether to renew an IHE’s authorization to operate.240 
Nevertheless, a survey of state higher education stakeholders suggested they may 
have an appetite to require “institutions to submit assessable learning outcomes and 
descriptions of how the proposed program will meet those outcomes in meaningful 
ways [so that] during follow-up reviews of approved programs, states and systems 
might require institutions to provide evidence of the programs’ success in 
accomplishing the approved student learning outcomes.”241 States must act to 
protect students because if they do not, many times no one else will. 
Some states actively work to protect students in these ways. In Florida, Ohio, 
and Oregon, state education officials are using student outcome data to evaluate 
IHEs. Florida Commission for Independent Education, for example, requires an 
improvement plan from unaccredited institutions whose placement rate falls below 
sixty percent, with potential for license revocation should the institution’s 
placement rate not improve.242 Similarly, the “Oregon Department of Education’s 
Private Career School office may put a program on probation should its completion 
or placement rate drop below fifty percent.”243 Ohio’s annual authorization 
renewals, for example, include on-site inspections and a review of the institution’s 
student outcomes, such as graduation and job placement rates.244 
 
237. Maggio, supra note 87, at 148. 
238. Id. 
239. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 11 (“44 of the 70 state boards require institutions to 
report some measure of student outcomes.”); see TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13 (“Thirty-six 
of the 70 state authorizing agencies do not require any measure of student outcomes to be reported in 
the reauthorization process”); id. at 19 (“States may want to consider making participation in the state 
postsecondary student unit record data system a part of the authorization process. Requiring institutions 
that are seeking authorization or renewal to develop agreements for regular submissions to the state 
postsecondary data system would ensure the collection of consistent data elements and outcomes 
measures for all institutions. Moreover, states could match the student-level data with other state 
data . . . .”). 
240. Maggio, supra note 87, at 5 (discussing the impact of both “student financial aid and direct 
institutional aid” but not disaggregating the two); TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (“Institutions 
are not asked to provide any indicators of student success (graduation/completion rates, student loan 
default rates, job placement rates).”). 
241. TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 16. 
242. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6E-2.004(10)(c) (2013) (“A nonaccredited institution holding 
provisional or annual licensure shall report its placement rate as defined by the Commission with each 
license review. If the placement rate falls below 60%, the Commission shall place the institution on a 
placement improvement plan . . . . If the progress report does not show improvement as accepted by 
the Commission, the Commission shall take actions up to and including revocation of license.”). 
243. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12. 
244. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 11. 
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Unfortunately, the required reporting varies substantially among states.245 
Most pertinent to this Article—which suggests that states should adopt CDR 
metrics, gainful employment rule, and financial responsibility scores—only  
twenty-eight (of seventy) state boards require IHEs to report on “job-placement 
rates,” only three “require wage data,” and only four require CDRs.246 In other 
words, “[d]espite the rising concern over delinquency and default rates and  
debt-to-income ratios, few states are considering the return on investment for 
students when reauthorizing institutions to operate in their state.”247  
States have an important role to play in protecting students. States should not 
cede their obligations to protect students to other members of the triad.248 Instead, 
states should invest in strengthening “the processes by which they carry out their 
authorization functions.”249 “A central focus of the authorization process ought to 
be quality assurance and improvement.”250 Admittedly, it will require difficult 
political choices for state leaders to provide additional funding for this work, 
particularly during the pandemic. 
c. Endorsements on State Authorization 
State authorization need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Instead, states 
could prod IHEs to provide better value to their students by embracing the idea of 
tiered authorizations. An initial authorization could allow a new IHE to engage in 
fairly limited operations. States might restrict the size and scope of an IHE’s 
operations until the IHE has a demonstrated track record of producing good 
student outcomes.251 At that point, the state might authorize the IHE to increase 
enrollment, offer new majors, open a branch campus, or expand in other ways.  
Some IHEs effectively police themselves along the lines that I have suggested. 
For example, Long Island University (LIU) recently decided to freeze new 
enrollment in several of its degree programs, while allowing existing students to 
 
245. And sometimes it varies within a state, depending on which type of college is seeking 
reauthorization. See Maggio, supra note 87, at 104–06 (discussing license renewals in New Jersey).  
246. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12 (“43 boards require graduation rates, 28 require  
job-placement rates, 10 require retention rates, 4 require licensure exam passage rates, 4 require  
cohort-default rates, and 3 require wage data.”). 
247. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 13. But see TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 
16 (“[C]lose to 80 percent of survey respondents reported using quality assurance metrics in program 
approval. However, program approval is often viewed as a bureaucratic compliance exercise with little 
connection to other quality assurance efforts.”). 
248. See TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 6. 
249. Id.; see also TANDBERG & MARTIN, supra note 108, at 4 (“Making these processes 
substantive and focused on quality assurance is challenging but necessary.”).  
250. TANDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 19. 
251. But see Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A New State Bill Could Challenge Key Interstate Distance 
Learning Pact, EDUC. DIVE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.educationdive.com/news/a-new-state-bill-
could-challenge-key-interstate-distance-learning-pact/573513/ [https://perma.cc/ST3B-9W59] 
(reporting on limitations states face in regulating IHEs that provide distance education because of  
NC-SARA participation). 
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complete their degrees.252 LIU’s vice president for academic affairs suggested that 
the criteria for selecting which programs to discontinue was based on whether the 
programs were “competitive, relevant and of the highest quality for our students.”253 
Instead of relying on IHEs to self-police, state regulators could restrict IHEs from 
offering programs that aren’t of the “highest quality.”254 
2. Financial Incentives for Better Student Outcomes 
In addition to the threat of declining an IHE’s authorization to operate in 
state, a state could also use the carrot of making additional funds available. These 
funds could be made available directly to students at eligible institutions or be given 
directly to the institutions themselves. This section discusses two such  
options: tuition assistance grants (TAGs) or performance-based funding. 
Historically, TAG funding has only been available to nonprofit IHEs and 
performance-based funding has only been available to public IHEs. Thus, the 
primary mechanism for regulating for-profit IHEs will continue to  
be authorization.255 
a. Tuition Assistance Grants 
States already provide substantial funding directly to students attending certain 
IHEs. For example, “[i]n 2010–2011, nine percent of total student grant aid came 
from state governments.”256 These TAGs are given to students at certain, usually 
nonprofit, IHEs. Research has shown that this aid has “a weak but measurable 
impact on the enrollments and finances of private institutions across the  
United States.”257  
If states were so inclined, TAGs might “become a highly effective lever” to 
ensure that IHEs are meeting certain minimum expectations for student 
 
252. See Elizabeth Redden, Putting Liberal Arts Programs on Ice, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 25, 
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/25/long-island-university-freezes-enrollments-
many-liberal-arts-programs [https://perma.cc/QC53-W38S] (discussing Long Island University’s 
decision to discontinue offering certain majors “in art history, earth system science, French, Italian, 
music performance, Spanish, geography and geology”). 
253. See id. 
254. See id. 
255. However, states could also levy “penalties for an assortment of violations.” TANDBERG 
ET AL., supra note 15, at 21. While also a stick, penalties are not an all-or-nothing proposition like 
authorization has historically been.  
256. Maggio, supra note 87, at 22. 
257. Id. at 5. 
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outcomes.258 States could and should tie the availability of TAGs to whether the 
student attends a high-performing IHE.259 
Unfortunately, it generally doesn’t seem that states are using TAGs to improve 
student outcomes because they are not tying continued access to TAGs to those 
outcomes.260 Kelly, James, & Columbus found “few states actually renew 
authorizations on the basis of [student] outcomes” despite a substantial majority of 
states collecting student outcome data.261 For example, New Jersey “has one of the 
nation’s most generous TAG programs, covering both nonprofit and for-profit 
colleges,” but IHEs in New Jersey “are not required to engage in any reporting on 
outcomes in order to justify their continued eligibility to receive the funding.”262 
And other states, such as Arizona, don’t offer any sort of “statewide financial aid 
program,” making this tool unavailable to them.263  
b. Performance-Based Funding 
While TAG funds flow directly to students, policymakers could also funnel 
money directly to high-value IHEs. And most states do already use some version of 
performance-based funding for public IHEs, in which money flows directly to the 
IHEs based on achieving certain student outcome benchmarks.264 Common 
benchmarks “include retention and graduation rates, job placement, graduation 
 
258. Id. at 125 (“TAG grant frees them from reliance on federal standards [and] it also serves 
as a mechanism for the state to ensure that for-profit institutions adhere to certain minimal standards. 
Should the state ever wish to begin enforcing stricter standards or to enact new accountability 
mechanisms, the availability of the TAG grant would become a highly effective lever with which to 
coerce the cooperation of the for-profit sector.”); id. at 22 (explaining that TAGs “requir[e] institutions 
participating in state grant programs to meet certain loan default rate standards”). 
259. It is possible, however, that the cost of higher education is not salient to students for any 
number of reasons. In that case, tying a student’s eligibility for a TAG to whether that student attends 
a high-quality IHE might mean that students who attend low-quality IHEs would be worse off because 
they’ll both receive a less useful degree and they’ll pay more for that degree. Cf. Jonathan D. Glater, 
Law School, Debt, and Discrimination, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548 (2019) (discussing various circumstances 
where the least advantaged students would pay more for law school). 
260. KELLY ET AL., supra note 115, at 12 (describing the use of outcomes in state higher 
education decision-making as “extremely rare”). 
261. Id. at 12. But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 6 (claiming that few states 
systemically collect useful student outcome data). 
262. Maggio, supra note 87, at 121. 
263. Id. at 207. 
264. David A. Tandberg & Nicholas W. Hillman, State Higher Education Performance  
Funding: Data, Outcomes, and Policy Implications, 39 J. EDUC. FIN. 222, 223 (2014) (“State performance 
funding programs are incentive systems that link institution funding levels to performance outcomes.”); 
ARMSTRONG & ZABACK, supra note 145, at 9 (reporting that twenty-six state higher education agencies 
“indicated their states use a performance formula to allocate funds to postsecondary institutions”); 
MCCANN & LAITINEN, supra note 14, at 19; Alicia C. Dowd, From Access to Outcome  
Equity: Revitalizing the Democratic Mission of the Community College, 586 ANNALS  
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 109–10 (2003) (“Most state legislatures have embraced the practice of 
linking tax-dollar support for public colleges to performance, even though a large share of public-college 
officials remain convinced that doing so is a bad idea.”). But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 
26, at 4 (“[Nineteen] states were experimenting with some form of outcomes-based funding.”). 
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credits and time to degree, licensure test scores, workforce training and 
development, and two- to four-year transfers.”265 Funding levels vary between two 
and ten percent of an IHEs funding.266 
Historically, performance-based funding has been both limited to public IHEs 
and of questionable efficacy to improve institutional quality. Some researchers have 
found that incentives have either been insufficiently large or poorly tailored toward 
improving student outcomes to create “a significant relationship between 
performance funding and improved institutional performance.”267 For example, the 
most frequently cited outcome that legislators claim to want when they embrace 
performance funding is to improve degree completion rates.268 The efficacy of 
performance funding is unclear. Some find the “introduction of performance 
funding does not have a statistically significant impact on the total number of 
baccalaureate degrees produced within the performance funding states.”269 But 
other researchers have found that, “although the monetary incentives have not been 
large, campus administrators have responded to them.”270 And one study from 
Ohio “found that Ohio’s performance funding reduced median time to degree for 
in-state bachelor’s students from 4.7 years to 4.3 years and led to a thirteen percent 
increase in bachelor’s degrees for at-risk students.”271 
Even if initial experiments with performance-based funding haven’t been as 
effective as we might like, that does not mean that the idea should be abandoned. 
Research suggests that states have been insufficiently patient with IHEs and that it 
is not until the program is up and running for a long time that “performance funding 
has a positive and significant impact on the number of degrees produced.”272 
“Outcomes-based funding is not a new idea in higher education, but early efforts 
 
265. Dowd, supra note 264, at 109; Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 223 (explaining that 
outcomes include: “student retention, graduation rates, student scores on licensure exams, job 
placement rates, faculty productivity, and campus diversity.”); Taylor, supra note 101, at 750 
(“[I]nstitutions have had to provide evidence of successful outcomes, particularly as they relate to 
student learning.”). 
266. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 224 (“Some states reserve up to 10% of an 
institution’s funding as performance funding; others reserve as little as 2%. In most cases performance 
funding serves as a bonus. However, a few states take performance funding further and embed it into 
their base funding formula.”). But see KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 4 (“Tennessee has 
the country’s boldest performance-based funding system—a 2010 law set up a system whereby 80–100 
percent of the higher education budget is based on remedial course completion, retention rates, and 
degree completion. Tennessee’s system pays a premium for completions by adult students and those 
receiving Pell Grants. The performance criteria are weighted to reflect the different sectors—two-year 
and open-access campuses are not held to the same standards as research universities.”). 
267. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 223; see also Maggio, supra note 87, at 27 
(“[P]erformance-based funding initiatives were rapidly proliferating but were not resulting in desired 
impact or improvement.”). 
268. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 229 (“Increasing total baccalaureate degree 
completions is the most frequently cited goal . . . .”). 
269. Id. at 236. 
270. Dowd, supra note 264, at 109. 
271. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 4. 
272. Tandberg & Hillman, supra note 264, at 239. 
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were typically timid: states would either link a very small percentage (too small to 
inspire meaningful change) of an institution’s budget to student outcomes or create 
a pot of money that institutions could win as a bonus on top of their base 
funding.”273 Finally, too many funding policies are enrollment driven. They 
encourage IHEs “to bring students in the front door but provide less incentive to 
make sure they progress all the way through—or actually learn anything in  
the process.”274 
CONCLUSION 
Higher education offers students opportunities for both economic and 
intellectual advancement. While both are important, this Article has focused 
primarily on economic advancement because value-added measures of institutional 
effectiveness can be both contested and contentious.275 In addition, the American 
higher education funding system—which is predicated on individuals debt-funding 
their own educations—encourages research to focus on economic growth. Even if 
a student receives an excellent education while in school, if that student cannot 
repay their educational debt, they will suffer hardship.  
This Article has considered three ways that states could serve as stewards of 
higher educational quality and ensure that students receive a positive return on their 
economic investments. States can and should ensure that students attend  
high-quality IHEs by refusing to reauthorize IHEs that fail new, state-based CDR 
metrics and gainful employment rules, or that fail to demonstrate that they have the 
financial wherewithal to stay open for a student’s entire time in college. Without 
state authorization, IHEs will lose access to Title IV funds, forcing many low-value 
IHEs to improve or close. Generally speaking, this ought to protect students. Only 
by vigorously protecting students by policing institutional quality will states fulfill 
their role as a member of the program integrity triad.  
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273. KELLY & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 26, at 3. 
274. Id. 
275. DOUGLAS N. HARRIS, VALUE-ADDED MEASURES IN EDUCATION: WHAT EVERY 
EDUCATOR NEEDS TO KNOW (2011); see also Itzkowitz, supra note 21 (“[T]here’s still minimal 
consensus on how to accurately gauge the value that students get from attending a specific higher 
education institution or program.”). 
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